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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
HAVEN M. WHITEAR,
Petitioner,
Case No. 980037-CA
vs.
Priority No. 7
BROWN & ROOT, INC. and
HIGHLANDS INSURANCE
COMPANY and the EMPLOYERS'
REINSURANCE FUND,
Respondents.

Brief of Petitioner Haven M. Whitear

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§34A-1-30(2)(b), Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-303(2)(c)(ii), Utah Code Ann. §34A-1303(6), Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801 (7), Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801 (8) (a), and Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (1953, as amended.)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issues presented in this appeal and standards of review
(1) Did the respondents waive any entitlement they may have had for the Labor
Commission to hold the hearing on February 7, 1996? (R. 1407-1408, 1640)
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue
is the abuse of discretion standard. Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review, 776
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989)

(2) Was the February 7, 1987 industrial accident a factor in causing Mr.
Whitear's depression? (R. 1 4 0 8 - 1 4 1 1 , 1640)
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue is
the abuse of discretion substantial evidence standard.

Grace Drilling

Company

v.

Board of Review, 11Q P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989)
(3) Did the administrative law judge abuse his discretion when he dismissed Mr.
Whitear's claim for permanent total disability benefits? (R. 1 4 1 2 - 1 4 1 3 , 1640)
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue
is the correction of error standard. Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review,

11§

P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989)
(4) Did the administrative law judge fail to comply w i t h the

Industrial

Commission's order of remand, and his o w n prehearing ruling, when he resolved
issues other than the cause of Mr. Whitear's depression? (R. 1 4 0 8 - 1 4 1 1 , 1640)
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue is
the correction of error standard. Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review,

11Q

P.2d 6 3 , 68 (Utah App. 1989)
(5) Did the administrative law judge abuse his discretion when he ruled that Mr.
Whitear's testimony lacked credibility? (R. 1413-1414,1640-1641)
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue
is the substantial evidence standard. Grace Drilling Company v. Board of

Review,

776 P.2d 6 3 , 68 (Utah App. 1989)
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(6) Did the administrative law judge violate the provisions of the Administrative
Procedures Act by not making any findings of fact and conclusions of law but
instructing the respondents' counsel to prepare such findings and conclusions? (R.
1415-1416, 1641)
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue
is the correction of error standard. Bruczynski v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 934
P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1 997)
(7) Did the Industrial Commission violate the provisions of the Administrative
Procedures Act by denying Mr. Whitear a hearing on his claim for permanent total
disability benefits? (R. 1412-1413, 1640)
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue
is the correction of error standard. Bruczynski v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 934
P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1997)
(8) Did the Industrial Commission violate Article I, §11 of the Constitution of
Utah by denying Mr. Whitear the right to a hearing on his claim for permanent total
disability benefits? (R. 1412-1413, 1640)
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue
is the correction of error standard. Bruczynski v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 934
P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1997)
(9) Did the Industrial Commission violate Article I, §7 of the Constitution of
Utah by denying Mr. Whitear the right to a hearing on his claim for permanent total
disability benefits? (R. 1412-1413, 1640)
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Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review to resolve this issue
is the correction of error standard. Bruczynski v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 934
P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1997)
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The determinative statutes, rules and constitutional provisions in resolving this
case are set forth in full in the Addendum to this Brief. Those Utah Code Ann. §35-169, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67, Utah Administrative Procedures Act §63-46b-8, Utah
Administrative Procedures Act §63-46b-10, Article I, §7 of the Constitution of Utah,
and Article I, §11 of the Constitution of Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case
This is a workers compensation claim by petitioner Haven M. Whitear
(hereinafter "Mr. Whitear") for permanent total disability benefits provided by the
Workers Compensation Act of Utah. (R. 522)
Course of proceedings
On August 7, 1987 Judge Allen of the Industrial Commission of Utah entered
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 26-27) That Order was entered
after the respondents notified Judge Allen that "they were accepting liability for an
industrial accident . . . when the applicant was drenched with fyrquel 220, which
leaked from a damaged hydraulic hose." The respondents also agreed "to pay all
outstanding medical expenses to date incurred by the applicant."

Judge Allen's

August 7, 1987 Order expressly served as a protection of rights for Mr. Whitear and
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reserved jurisdiction over this claim if any further dispute developed between the
parties.

(R. 26)

On February 16, 1993 Mr. Whitear filed a second Application for Hearing,
claiming to be entitled to permanent partial disability benefits and also asserting that
the respondents had failed to pay medical bills. (R. 453) The respondents in their
answer to said Application for Hearing denied any liability.

(R. 463-465) On

September 7, 1993 Mr. Whitear filed an amended Application for Hearing asserting
the additional claim of permanent total disability. (R. 522-523) The respondents in
their answer to said amended Application for Hearing merely denied the claim for
permanent total disability benefits and moved to join the Employers Reinsurance Fund.
(R. 530) The respondents did not raise any affirmative defenses in their amended
answer nor did they incorporate their prior answer into their amended answer. (R.
530)
A hearing was held on February 22, 1994. Following that hearing, Judge Allen
entered his Preliminary Findings of Fact and referred the claim to a medical panel. (R.
930-933) The respondents did not object to the case being referred to a medical
panel. The Medical Panel issued its report on or about May 25, 1994. (R. 938-945)
Mr. Whitear filed an objection to the medical panel report. That objection was based
upon the fact that the Medical Panel did not attribute any of his depression to the
February 17, 1987 industrial accident. (R. 961) The respondents did not file a timely
objection to the medical panel report.
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On March 17, 1995 Mr. Whitear, the only party objecting to the medical panel
report, withdrew his request for hearing on his objection to the medical panel's report
without waiving his specific objection. (R. 967-968) Mr. Whitear not only withdrew
his request for a hearing, he also requested that Judge Allen enter an appropriate
Order based upon the medical evidence before him.

(R. 968) Once again the

respondents did not object. In fact, the respondents did not respond at all to Mr.
Whitear's withdrawal of his request for a hearing on his objection to the medical panel
report nor did they respond to Mr. Whitear's request that Judge Allen enter an
appropriate Order.
On April 20, 1995, thirty-five days after Mr. Whitear withdrew his request for
hearing and requested the entry of an appropriate order, Judge Allen entered his
Interim Order referring the applicant to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for
evaluation pursuant to §35-1-67. (R. 970-972) On May 9, 1995, 350 days after the
Medical Panel report, 54 days after Mr. Whitear withdrew his request for a hearing and
20 days after the date of the Interim Order was entered, the respondents finally filed
a vague Motion for Review. (R. 974-977) The Industrial Commission issued an Order
of Remand on July 3 1 , 1995 instructing the administrative law judge "to conduct a
hearing on the medical panel's report, particularly regarding the causes of Mr.
Whitear's depression. The ALJ may take such other action as is necessary and
appropriate to fully develop the record regarding the cause and extent of Mr. Whitear's
depression and related disability." (R. 983-986) A hearing was scheduled on February
7, 1996. Prior to that hearing Mr. Whitear's counsel requested that Judge George
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consider hearing evidence on the issue of Mr. Whitear's vocational rehabilitation. (R.
1000-1001) The respondents' counsel objected to this request. (R. 996-999 ) Judge
George on December 29, 1996 notified all counsel that the February 7, 1996 hearing
would be limited to resolving the issue of determining the causation of Mr. Whitear's
depression.

(R. 1002) Following the hearing, Judge George stated that the

respondents were liable to pay all reasonable medical expenses related to the
treatment for asthma. In fact, Mr. Poelman, the defendant's counsel, did not have any
objections or questions when Judge George made his ruling requiring the respondents
to pay all medical bills incurred by Mr. Whitear for the treatment of his asthma. (R.
1324)
Judge George entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on
the 26th day of July 1996. (R. 1389-1400) The Labor Commission entered its Order
on Motion for Review on December 19, 1997. (R. 1639-1645)
Disposition by the Industrial Commission
The Labor Commission of Utah entered its Order on Motion for Review on
December 19, 1997.

(R. 1639-1645) The Labor Commission of Utah essentially

affirmed Judge George's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 16391645)
Statement of Facts
1. Mr. Whitear sustained an injury arising out of and during the course of his
employment with Brown & Root on February 17, 1987. (R. 26-27)
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2.

On August 7, 1987 Judge Allen of the Industrial Commission of Utah

entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. That Order was entered after
the respondents notified Judge Allen that "they were accepting liability for an
industrial accident . . . when the applicant was drenched with fyrquel 220, which
leaked from a damaged hydraulic hose/' The respondents further agreed "to pay all
outstanding medical expenses to date incurred by the applicant/'

Judge Allen's

August 7, 1987 Order expressly served as a protection of rights for Mr. Whitear and
reserved jurisdiction over this claim if any further dispute developed between the
parties. (R. 26-27)
3. Mr. Whitear filed a second Application for Hearing, dated February 15,
1993, claiming to be entitled to permanent partial disability benefits and asserting that
the respondents failed to pay medical expenses as ordered by Judge Allen. 1 (R. 453)
4. The respondents in their answer to said Application for Hearing denied any
liability. (R. 463-465)
5.

On September 7, 1993 Mr. Whitear filed an amended Application for

Hearing asserting the additional claim of permanent total disability. (R. 522-523)
6. The respondents in their answer to said amended Application for Hearing
merely denied the claim for permanent total disability benefits and moved to join the
Employers Reinsurance Fund. The respondents did not raise any affirmative defenses
in their amended answer nor did they incorporate their prior answer into their amended
answer. (R. 530)
1

On June 6, 1998 Mr. Whitear was forced to file another Application for Hearing because the
respondents continue to refuse to pay for his medical expenses.
Page 11

7. The respondents, through their adjusters at Black, Nichols & Guiver, began
to deny liability for the payment of medical expenses in October 1990.
8. Mr. Whitear filed his responses to Interrogatories in June of 1 990 and again
in June of 1993. In both responses Mr. Whitear identified unpaid medical expenses.
(R. 503-518)
9. A hearing was finally held on February 22, 1994. After that hearing, Judge
Allen entered his Preliminary Findings of Fact and referred the claim to a medical
panel. (R. 930-933)
10. The respondents did not object to this claim being referred to a medical
panel.
11. The Medical Panel issued its report on or about May 25, 1994. (R. 938945)
12. Mr. Whitear, after being granted an extension of time by Judge Allen to
file an objection to the medical panel report, did file an objection to the medical panel
report. The objection was based upon the fact that the Medical Panel did not attribute
any of Mr. Whitear's depression to the February 17, 1987 industrial accident. (R. 961)
13. The respondents did not file a timely objection to the medical panel report.
14. Mr. Whitear's objection to the medical panel report was scheduled for
hearing on March 8, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. Mr. Whitear appeared along with his three
witnesses, including Dr. Cali. The respondents failed to appear at the hearing. The
hearing was canceled because of Mr. Poelman's alleged health problems. However,
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neither Mr. Whitear nor his counsel were notified that the hearing had been canceled.
(R. 967-968)
15. On March 17, 1995 Mr. Whitear, the only party objecting to the medical
panel report, withdrew his request for hearing on his objection to the medical panel's
report without waiving his specific objection. (R. 967-968)
16. Mr. Whitear not only withdrew his request for a hearing, he also requested
that Judge Allen enter appropriate Order based upon the medical evidence before him.
(R. 968)
17. Once again the respondents did not object. In fact, the respondents did
not respond to Mr. Whitear's withdrawal of his request for a hearing on his objection
to the medical panel report nor did they respond to Mr. Whitear's request that Judge
Allen enter an appropriate Order.
18. On April 2 0 , 1995, thirty five days after Mr. Whitear w i t h d r e w his request
for hearing and requested the entry of an appropriate order, Judge Allen entered his
Interim Order referring Mr. Whitear to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for
evaluation pursuant to §35-1-67. (R. 970-972)
19. On May 9, 1995, 3 5 0 days after the medical panel report, 54 days after
Mr. Whitear w i t h d r e w his request for a hearing and 20 days after the date of the
Interim Order, the respondents filed a vague Motion for Review. (R. 974-977)
2 0 . As a result of that Motion for Review the Industrial Commission issued an
Order of Remand on July 3 1 , 1995 instructing the ALJ "to conduct a hearing on the
medical panel's report, particularly regarding the causes of Mr. Whitear's depression.
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The ALJ may take such other action as is necessary and appropriate to fully develop
the record regarding the cause and extent of Mr. Whitear's depression and related
disability." (R. 983-986)
2 1 . Prior to the February 7, 1996 hearing, Mr. Whitear's counsel requested
that Judge George consider hearing evidence on the issue of Mr. Whitear's vocational
rehabilitation. (R. 1000-1001)
22.

The respondents' counsel objected to Mr. Whitear's request.

On

December 29, 1995 Judge George notified counsel that the February 7, 1996 hearing
would be limited to the issue of determining the causation of Mr. Whitear's
depression. (R. 1002-1003)
23. Dr. Burgoyne, a member of the Medical Panel testified at the February 7,
1996 hearing. During his testimony Dr. Burgoyne admitted that the industrial accident
was a factor in causing Mr. Whitear's depression. (R. 1043, 1054)
24. The respondents failed to produce any evidence at the February 7, 1996
hearing that they are not liable for the payment of medical expenses incurred by Mr.
Whitear with respect to the treatment he has received for asthma.
25.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge George stated that the

respondents were liable to pay all reasonable medical expenses related to the
treatment for asthma. Mr. Poelman, the defendant's counsel, did not question or
object to Judge George's ruling that the respondents pay for all of Mr. Whitear's
medical care and treatment related to Mr. Whitear's asthma. (R. 1324)
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26. The only evidence presented to Judge George at the February 7, 1996
hearing as to the cause of Mr. Whitear's disability was the uncontradicted testimony
of Mr. Whitear with respect to asthma, the finding by social security that Mr. Whitear
is disabled primarily due to the asthma (R. 57, 852-854) and the August 18, 1995
report form the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation that Mr. Whitear is not a viable
candidate for vocational rehabilitation. (R. 1510)
27. All medical experts who submitted records and/or testimony in this claim
agree that Mr. Whitear suffers from depression. The only doctor who did not attribute
any causal connection of the depression to the industrial accident was the
respondents' doctor.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Once again this Court is the forum of last resort for an injured worker who,
after sustaining an injury while working, has had the effects of the physical injuries
compounded by the Labor Commission's actions. This is not a case of an injured
worker asking this Court to award him anything to which he is not entitled under the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
This case is about Mr. Whitear who was injured in an industrial accident on
February 17, 1987 and his claim for permanent total disability benefits.

The

respondents are under order to pay Mr. Whitear for all medical expenses he incurs in
the treatment of the injuries he sustained in the February 17, 1987 industrial accident.
There is no dispute that Mr. Whitear suffers from asthma, which was caused
by the February 17, 1987 industrial accident.

There is also no dispute that Mr.
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Whitear has been found to be totally disabled by the Social Security Administration
primarily due to the asthma from which he suffers. There is also no dispute that Mr.
Whitear has been evaluated by the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation and found by
that office not to be a viable candidate for vocational rehabilitation primarily due to the
limitations of his asthma.
Mr. Whitear presented his claim for permanent total disability benefits to the
Labor Commission of Utah. Judge Allen, after reviewing all of the evidence, entered
an Interim Order making a tentative finding that Mr. Whitear was indeed permanently
and totally disabled, and referring this claim to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation
for an evaluation.
Before entering his Interim Order, Judge Allen had this claim reviewed by a
medical panel. The medical panel issued a written report wherein it concluded that
Mr. Whitear had a substantial whole person impairment due to the asthma. The
respondents never objected to Judge Allen's referral of the claim to a medical panel.
The respondents never filed a timely objection to the report issued by the medical
panel. The respondents never filed a timely request for a hearing disputing any portion
of the medical panel's report.
Only Mr. Whitear filed an objection to a minor portion of the medical panel's
report. There is no dispute that Mr. Whitear suffers from depression. The medical
panel concluded that Mr. Whitear's depression, although significant, was not caused
by the February 17, 1987 industrial accident. Mr. Whitear, based upon his doctor's
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opinion challenged the medical panel's conclusion that the depression was not caused
by the industrial accident.
A hearing was scheduled by Judge Allen on Mr. Whitear's objection to the
medical panel's report. Mr. Whitear and all of his witnesses appeared at the hearing
only to learn it had been cancelled. Thereafter, Mr. Whitear withdrew his request for
a hearing, without waiving his objections to the medical panel report and requested
that Judge Allen enter an appropriate Order. Judge Allen entered such an Order and
concluded that Mr. Whitear's depression was caused by the February 17, 1987
accident. Judge Allen reached this conclusion because the medical panel did not
address the issue of causation and the respondents' doctor also failed to state the
cause of Mr. Whitear's depression.
The respondent did not object to Mr. Whitear withdrawing his request for a
hearing. The respondents did not object to Mr. Whitear's request that Judge Allen
enter an appropriate Order.
It was not until May 9, 1995, 350 days after the medical panel report, 54 days
after Mr. Whitear withdrew his request for a hearing and 20 days after the date of the
Interim Order, that the respondents finally responded by filing a vague Motion for
Review.
The Labor Commission granted the respondents' Motion for Review and
remanded the case for further hearing. The hearing was limited to resolving the issue
of what caused Mr. Whitear's depression.
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On remand, the claim was assigned to Judge George. Judge George had no
familiarity with this claim. Judge George took it upon himself to expressly limit the
hearing, pursuant to the Order of Remand, to resolving the issue of causation. Judge
George, and the Labor Commission, were under the mistaken impression that Mr.
Whitear was totally disabled due to his depression. The records clearly demonstrate
two points. First, Mr. Whitear is primarily totally disabled due to asthma. Second, Mr.
Whitear never suffered from depression until after the February 17, 1987 industrial
accident.
Nonetheless, Judge George, after hearing overwhelming evidence in support
of Mr. Whitear's claim that the depression was indeed caused by the industrial
accident, and, after hearing the medical panel expert on depression concede that the
industrial accident did contribute to Mr. Whitear's depression, Judge George still
concluded that Mr. Whitear's depression was not caused by the industrial accident.
Judge George reached this conclusion even after receiving the testimonial concession
by the medical panel's expert that the February 17, 1987 was indeed a factor in
causing Mr. Whitear's depression.

That testimony by the medical panel expert

modified the panel's written report.
After Judge George ignored the evidence, he augmented his error by dismissing
Mr. Whitear's claim for permanent total disability benefits. Judge George concluded
that Mr. Whitear was not totally disabled due to asthma. The only evidence before
Judge George was contrary to this conclusion.
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The Labor Commission and Judge George notified Mr. Whitear that a hearing
would be held to determine what caused his depression. At the conclusion of that
hearing, not only did Judge George make, and the Labor Commission affirmed, an
insupportable ruling on the only issue which ostensibly was to be resolved, but Mr.
Whitear's entire claim was dismissed.
Mr. Whitear was never given a hearing on his claim for permanent total
disability benefits. Mr. Whitear has a right to such a hearing. That right is given to
him by the Constitution of the State of Utah and by the Administrative Procedures
Act.
Our system of jurisprudence is controlled and regulated by laws and rules.
Underlying all those laws and rules are fundamental principles of justice and fairness.
Where is the fairness and the justice when a judge can limit a party to presenting
evidence at a hearing on only one issue and then the judge, at the end of the hearing,
enters an order resolving all the issues? That is what Judge George and the Labor
Commission did to Mr. Whitear. Judge George and the Labor Commission reversed
the tentative finding of permanent total disability made by Judge Allen without the
benefit of any additional or new evidence. The only evidence before Judge George
and the Labor Commission which was not available to Judge Allen was the admission
by the medical panel expert on depression that Mr. Whitear's industrial accident was
a factor in causing Mr. Whitear's depression.

Such an admission reaffirmed the

appropriateness of Judge Allen's Order. Such an admission emphasizes the fallacy of
Judge George's ruling and the Labor Commission's adoption of that ruling.
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The Labor Commission and Judge George abused their discretion at nearly
every turn in this case. They granted the respondents a hearing when the respondents
failed to file a timely request for a hearing. The respondents waited nearly one year,
350 days, before they made any objections or requests for hearing on the report
issued by the medical panel.

Had Mr. Whitear been so utterly lackadaisical in

requesting a hearing, it is unlikely that he would have been granted such leeway by
the Labor Commission. By ruling against Mr. Whitear, Judge George and the Labor
Commission totally ignored the mountain of evidence which was presented in support
of Mr. Whitear's claim.
Judge George failed to make any findings of fact. Instead he delegated his
legal obligation to counsel for the respondents to make appropriate findings of fact.
The Labor Commission, instead of reprimanding a judge for shirking his duties, merely
fell in lock step with the judge and affirmed what he did and how he did it.
To remedy the injustice inflicted on Mr. Whitear by Judge George and the Labor
Commission, this Court must reinstate the order entered by Judge Allen and then
order the Labor Commission to hold appropriate hearings on the issue of Mr. Whitear's
vocational rehabilitation.
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ARGUMENT
Point I
DID THE RESPONDENTS WAIVE ANY ENTITLEMENT THEY
MAY HAVE HAD FOR THE LABOR COMMISSION TO HOLD
THE HEARING ON FEBRUARY 7, 1996.
The February 7, 1996 hearing should not have been held because the
respondents waived any entitlement to such hearing. It was Mr. Whitear who had
objected to the medical panel report. (R. 961) Specifically, Mr. Whitear objected that
the medical panel failed to conclude that the February 17, 1987 industrial accident
was the cause of his depression. Mr. Whitear requested and was granted a hearing
on his objection. On March 17, 1995 Mr. Whitear withdrew his request for hearing.
(R. 967-968) The respondents failed to object to Mr. Whitear's withdrawal of his
request for hearing. It was not until after Judge Allen entered his Interim Order on
April 20, 1995 that the defendants finally objected. (R. 974-977)
The Industrial Commission entered an Order of Remand on July 3 1 , 1995
recognizing that the order was not based on any statutory or rule authorizing the
remand. The question this Court must now answer is how a party who fails to object
to a report of a medical panel, who fails to request a hearing, and who fails to object
to the other party's withdrawal of a request for a hearing, is still entitled to a hearing
on an issue involving the medical panel's report?
The answer to that question must be that the party failing to object is NOT
entitled to a hearing. The statutes and rules are full of time limitations within which
certain action must be taken. Rule 568-1-5 of the Workers' Compensation Rules
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provides for the computation of time limits. The day of the act shall not be included
but the last day is unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal Holiday. The parties are
given 15 days to object to the medical panel report.

Failure to act within the

prescribed time limits bars further action. The party who fails to act within the
prescribed time limits has in essence waived any right to object.
In this case, the respondents never objected to the medical panel report. The
respondents did not request a hearing on Mr. Whitear's objections to the medical panel
for 350 days after the date the medical panel report was issued. The respondents did
not request or obtain an extension of time to seek a hearing on the objections to the
medical panel report.
It is submitted that if Mr. Whitear had waited 350 days to file his objections to
the report of the medical panel, his claim for hearing would have been denied by the
Labor Commission. So why can an employer and an insurance carrier obtain a hearing
when they waited so long to request the hearing?
Under these circumstances, this Court can only conclude that the respondents
waived any right to a hearing they may have had on objecting to the report of the
medical panel. That based upon that waiver, this Court must also rule that the Labor
Commission abused its discretion in allowing the respondents to have their hearing.
This abuse of discretion substantially prejudiced Mr. Whitear. Willardson v. Industrial
Commission, 904 P.2d 6 7 1 , 675 (Utah 1995)
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Point II
THE FEBRUARY 7, 1987 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT WAS A
FACTOR IN CAUSING MR. WHITEAR'S DEPRESSION.

This claim was remanded to the Administrative Law Judge by the Labor
Commission for the purpose of determining the cause of Mr. Whitear's depression. (R.
983-986) Mr. Whitear objected to a hearing being held in this matter after the
respondents had failed to file a timely objection to the report of the medical panel and
had failed to object to Mr. Whitear's withdrawal of his request for a hearing on his
objection to the medical panel report. (R. 1016-1020)
In its July 31,1995 Order of Remand the Labor Commission acknowledges that
its interference in claims in which a final order had not been entered, could disrupt the
adjudicatory process. (R. 983-986) Yet that is exactly what the Labor Commission
did by entering its Order of Remand.

It interrupted the process and gave the

respondents a reprieve from their failure to file timely objections to the report of the
medical panel.
The Labor Commission's interruption of the judicial process culminated in the
hearing scheduled before Judge George on February 7, 1996. Instead of Mr. Whitear
being evaluated for vocational rehabilitation, Judge George determined that a hearing
was necessary, because the respondents had requested it, to resolve the issue of
what caused Mr. Whitear's depression. Judge George expressly limited the hearing
to the resolution of that one issue.

(R. 1002-1003)

But the interruption and

corruption of the judicial process continued when Judge George dismissed Mr.
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Whitear's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the conclusion of the
February 7, 1996 hearing.
Since the issue to be resolved at the hearing was the cause of Mr. Whitear's
depression, the only real credible medical evidence presented was the testimony of Dr.
Burgoyne, the medical panel expert, although Dr. Cali and Dr. McCann also testified
on the issue. Their testimony was actually irrelevant since their disagreement on the
issue is what resulted in the matter being referred to the medical panel by Judge Allen.
Dr. Burgoyne, the psychiatrist and expert on depression for the medical panel,
testified that the industrial accident was a factor in causing Mr. Whitear's depression.
The following exchange took place between Mr. Whitear's counsel and Dr. Burgoyne:
"Q. [by counsel to Dr. Burgoyne] Your statement that the
ongoing legal dispute between Mr. Whitear and his former
employer, the insurance company, is a factor in his
depression; it that right?
A. It's a factor.
Q. Okay, So if that is a factor, then is it not true to say
that the accident then in some way is also a factor in
causing his depression?
A. I would have to say yes, but -- well there are many
things in life. Yes." (R. 1054)
Dr. Burgoyne further testified as follows:
"Q [by counsel to Dr. Burgoyne] Dr. Burgoyne, will you
concede that an individual who suffers an injury on the job,
besides the physical injury, that may also cause depression?
A. Injury on the job could cause depression, yes.
Q. However, in this case you concluded it didn't?
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A. I concluded it wasn't a very big factor."
(R. 1043)
Through his testimony Dr. Burgoyne contradicted and clarified the medical
panel's written report in which the panel concluded that Mr. Whitear's depression was
not caused by the industrial accident. This clarification should have been sufficient
for Judge George to rule that Mr. Whitear's depression was caused, at least in part,
by the industrial accident.
Mr. Whitear presented additional evidence that his depression was caused by
the industrial accident.
Craig Whitear testified to Mr. Whitear's ability to work and how his behavior
changed dramatically after the industrial accident.

Craig Whitear testified that Mr.

Whitear liked school, did not have a conflict with his step-mother and that Mr. Whitear
grieved as any normal person does when losing his mother. Craig Whitear further
testified that after the industrial accident Mr. Whitear became withdrawn and
reclusive.

(R. 1196-1211)

The testimony of Craig Whitear was supported by the testimony of Brent
Bohman. Mr. Bohman testified that he personally noticed a striking change in the
behavior of Mr. Whitear from before accident to after accident. (R. 1214-1223)
Jeff O'Driscoll also testified about the changes he observed in Mr. Whitear's
behavior after the industrial accident. (R. 1185-1187)
The respondents did not present any evidence to contradict the testimony of
Craig Whitear, Brent Bohman and Jeff O'Driscoll.
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The only evidence that the respondents presented on the issue of the cause of
Mr. Whitear's depression was the testimony of Dr. McCann.

That doctor even

contradicted himself when he testified that he "cannot identify specific - a single,
specific cause for his depression/" (R. 1304)
The respondents did not present any credible evidence that Mr. Whitear was
depressed before the industrial accident. In fact, the only evidence presented was the
testimony of the people who knew Mr. Whitear before and after the accident. Not one
of them testified about Mr. Whitear being depressed before the accident.
The medical panel clarified its written report when Dr. Burgoyne testified that
the industrial accident was a factor in causing Mr. Whitear's depression. Thus, for
Judge George to conclude that the depression was not caused, at least in part, by the
industrial accident was an arbitrary and capricious ruling which is not supported by
any credible, relevant and substantial evidence as required by Utah Code Ann. §6346b-16(4)(h)(iv).
Judge George's failure to consider the substantial evidence presented in
support of Mr. Whitear and in light of the medical panel expert clarified that panel's
written report by testifying that the industrial accident did contribute to Mr. Whitear's
depression, is an abuse of discretion. That abuse was compounded by the Labor
Commission affirming Judge George's ruling.

That abuse of discretion had the

ultimate prejudicial result. The dismissal of Mr. Whitear's claim.
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Point III
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION WHEN HE DISMISSED MR. WHITEAR'S
CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS.

Given the very narrow and limited issue to be resolved at the February 7, 1996
hearing, it was a clear abuse of discretion to dismiss Mr. Whitear's claim for
permanent total disability benefits.
The Labor Commission in its July 3 1 , 1995 Order of Remand instructed Judge
George to "conduct a hearing on the medical panel's report, particularly regarding the
cause of Mr. Whitear's depression.

The ALJ may take such other action as is

necessary and appropriate to fully develop the record regarding the cause and extent
of Mr. Whitear's depression and related disability." (R. 983-986)
Judge George on December 29, 1995 instructed counsel that the issue to be
resolved at the February 7, 1996 hearing was the "causal connection" between the
industrial accident and Mr. Whitear's depression. There would not be any evidence
presented or considered concerning vocational rehabilitation. (R. 1002-1003)
In spite of Judge George's effort to limit the hearing issue, he did receive
evidence about Mr. Whitear's inability to work. First, Judge George received evidence
that the Social Security Administration had found Mr. Whitear to be totally disabled
primarily due to his asthma. (R. 944) Second, Judge George received a report from the
Utah State Office of Rehabilitation which indicates that due to Mr. Whitear's "severe
respiratory condition, including asthma and shortness of breath" he probably would
not benefit from rehabilitation services. (R. 1510-1511)
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There is no dispute that Mr. Whitear's asthma and respiratory problems are
caused by the industrial accident. (R. 944)
Neither the Social Security Administration nor the Office of Rehabilitation
considered the primary reason for their respective decisions to be Mr. Whitear's
depression. Those agencies considered Mr. Whitear's asthma the primary reason for
his disability and their inability to offer any vocational rehabilitation services.
Incredibly, Judge George signed, and the Labor Commission approved, an order which
concludes that Mr. Whitear is receiving social security benefits due to his depression.
(R. 1393)
Judge George limited the February 7, 1996 hearing issue to the cause of Mr.
Whitear's depression. Judge George did not take evidence on Mr. Whitear's asthma
which was caused by the industrial accident and for which the medical panel
attributed a 10% whole person impairment, a significant impairment rating. (R. 944)
Judge George received no evidence as to Mr. Whitear's inability to work, other than
the report from the Office of Rehabilitation, the Social Security Administration's
conclusion and some testimony from the lay witnesses. Nonetheless, Judge George
signed an order which concludes that Mr. Whitear is not totally disabled due to his
asthma. (R. 1395)
By limiting the issue for the February 7, 1996 hearing, and then entering
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order resolving the entire claim filed by Mr.
Whitear is contrary to the Labor Commission's Order of Remand and is so arbitrary
and capricious it smacks of prejudice.
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Point IV
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE LABOR COMMISSION'S ORDER OF REMAND
AND HIS OWN PREHEARING RULING.
Mr. Whitear is alleging that Judge George acted arbitrary and capricious when
he dismissed Mr. Whitear's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the end of
the February 7, 1996 hearing. The best evidence supporting this argument is the
Labor Commission's Order of Remand (R. 583-586)
29, 1995 ruling. (R. 1002-1003)

and Judge George's December

Both limit the February 7, 1996 hearing to one

narrow and specific issue. That issue was the causation of Mr. Whitear's depression.
Yet Judge George, at the end of that hearing, entered an Order which reached far
beyond resolving that very narrow issue.

Judge George's Order wiped out Mr.

Whitear's claim for permanent total disability benefits. (R. 1398)

There is no

justification or explanation for such an arbitrary and capricious act. The judge's ruling
is the judicial equivalent of the "bait and switch" sales method.

The Labor

Commission, in failing to correct the error made by the judge, is even more culpable
than the judge. The Labor Commission should protect injured workers from judicial
abuse by a judge. The Labor Commission should not become an accomplice to such
abuse. In this case, the Labor Commission chose to support an abuse of discretion.
Thus, it falls upon this Court to provide the appropriate relief.
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Point V
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION WHEN HE RULED THAT MR. WHITEAR
LACKED CREDIBILITY.

Judge George entered Findings of Fact to support his conclusion that Mr.
Whitear lacked credibility. 2 (R. 1393-1395) Some of these Findings were based upon
Judge George's idiosyncratic notions about perfumes, bathroom disinfectants and Mr.
Whitear's sex life. (R. 1393-1395, 1319-1320)
There was no evidence presented that any person in the courtroom during the
hearing was wearing any perfumes or colognes.

Nor was there any evidence

presented at the hearing about the "alleged'' disinfectants used in the restroom near
the courtroom. This Court can, and should, take judicial notice of the fact that there
are walls and doors which separate the courtrooms from the restroom, and that the
odors from one room cannot be detected in the other room.
Judge George did conclude that Mr. Whitear's sex life had not been adversely
affected by the accident and his depression. This conclusion was based upon the fact
that Mr. Whitear did become a father after the industrial accident. In fact, Judge
George stated that Mr. Whitear had sexual relations at least two times after the 1987
accident. (R. 1319-1320)

2

lt should be noted that Judge George only made two findings of fact on his o w n . One relating to Mr.
Whitear's sex life and the other relating to his testimony that he became reclusive. (R. 1309-1321) The
first is totally irrelevant to any issue in this claim and the second demonstrates a complete failure on the
part of ALJ to listen to the testimony. Finally, it must be noted that the Findings signed by the ALJ are not
his findings but are the findings of Mr. Poelman, defendants' counsel.
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Judge George continued to dismiss Mr. Whitear's testimony by remarking on
Mr. Whitear's habit of smoking. The fact that Mr. Whitear smoked and made attempts
to quit smoking does not demonstrate a lack of credibility. Smoking is not and was
not the cause of Mr. Whitear's depression or asthma. The medical panel did not find
or attribute any physical impairment or injury to Mr. Whitear's smoking.

It did

attribute the significant impairment to Mr. Whitear's asthma which was caused by the
industrial accident. (R. 944)
Dr. McCann did initially express concerns about Mr. Whitear "faking" on some
tests. However, after hearing the testimony from Mr. Whitear's friends and brother,
Dr. McCann testified that he was touched by the support Mr. Whitear has received
from his friends and family. In fact, after hearing the testimony of the lay witnesses,
Dr. McCann was impressed how socially isolated Mr. Whitear had become. Judge
George, however, found that the testimony of the witnesses who stated that Mr.
Whitear had become isolated, "runs counter" to Mr. Whitear's testimony that he has
become withdrawn. (R. 1321) Every witness agreed that Mr. Whitear has become
withdrawn.

Dr. McCann, the respondents' expert, realized that Mr. Whitear had

become socially withdrawn. Only Judge George and the Labor Commission failed, or
refused, to understand how much Mr. Whitear has withdrawn from his friends and
family since the industrial accident. Presented with such overwhelming testimony,
Judge George remarkably concluded Mr. Whitear has not socially withdrawn. (R.
1321)
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Dr. McCann, the witness whose testimony was most hostile toward Mr.
Whitear, testified that he realized Mr. Whitear has a real problem with depression and
that he felt very sympathetic toward him. (R. 1304)
Judge George stretched his enmity toward Mr. Whitear when he found that
there is an implication that Mr. Whitear may be using this system for some kind of
gain when he concludes that "[Mr. Whitear] is wise to the workers compensation
system." (R. 1395) That Finding is totally unsupported by any evidence. It is another
example of counsel for the respondents making a finding of the judge.
Considering how very little Mr. Whitear has gained financially and the hardship
Mr. Whitear has had to endure since the industrial accident, it would be fair to ask just
how wise is Mr. Whitear really?

How much gain has Mr. Whitear's "use" of the

system brought him?
The Findings concerning Mr. Whitear's alleged lack of credibility were drafted
by Mr. Poelman, without any guidance from Judge George. These Findings were
included, in an unethical attempt, to make it nearly impossible for Mr. Whitear to
challenge the findings on appeal. Those findings are in actuality the argument of
counsel and are unsupported by any evidence. There is not a scintilla of evidence to
support such findings and thus they must be reversed.

Clearly, if Mr. Whitear had

credibility, then Judge George's ruling would have been in favor of the claim. Instead
the unsupported findings concerning Mr. Whitear's lack of credibility have contributed
to the substantial prejudice suffered by Mr. Whitear through the indiscretion of the
Labor Commission.
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Point VI
JUDGE GEORGE VIOLATED THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES ACT BY NOT MAKING ANY FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BUT INSTRUCTING
MR. POELMAN TO PREPARE THEM FOR HIM.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act §63-46b-10 (1988, as amended)
provides as follows:
"In formal adjudicative proceedings:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing . . . the
presiding officer shall sign and issue an order that includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact
based exclusively on the evidence of record in the
adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially noted;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of
law)
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding
decision." [Emphasis added]

officer's

In this case, Judge George did not satisfy or comply with any of the above
cited provisions of §63-46b-10. Other than making the two findings of fact at the
conclusion of the hearing, on February 7, 1996, Judge George sent a FAX to Mr.
Poelman containing the following instructions:
"Mr. Poelman-Although I recited some specifics in my
decision this evening, that was not all-inclusive. You may
utilize all the support evidenced in your defense that you
feel is appropriate. If I feel that something more or less is
necessary, I'll ask for a disk so I can modify it. Thank
you.***DLG" (R. 1363)
In other words, Judge George delegated his statutory obligation to the defense
attorney. It may be appropriate for a judge to make specific findings and conclusions
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as required by law and then direct counsel to draft the order in accordance therewith.
It is totally inappropriate for a judge to allow defense counsel to make any findings
and conclusions that counsel deems appropriate.
This Court must reject the Findings and Conclusions signed by Judge George
on July 26, 1996 since they are not his Findings and Conclusions as required by law.
The fact that the Labor Commission adopted those Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law does not remedy the underlying problem.
Point VII
MR. WHITEAR HAS BEEN DENIED A HEARING ON HIS
CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS.

The Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-8, provides in
part,
"that in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall
be conducted."
Such a hearing shall provide all parties a reasonable opportunity to present their
positions.
Article 1, §7 of the Constitution of Utah provides that
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law/'
Article 1, §11 of the Constitution of Utah provides that
"all courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party."
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Judge George and the Labor Commission have denied Mr. Whitear the hearing
to which he is entitled pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act.

More

importantly, Judge George and the Labor Commission have deprived Mr. Whitear of
his right to due process and closed the door the Constitution guarantees will be open.
This was done to Mr. Whitear when he was informed that the February 7, 1996
hearing would only address the issue of establishing the causation of his depression.
The hearing was expressly limited to the resolution of that issue by Judge George and
the Labor Commission's July 3 1 , 1995 Order of Remand. At the end of that hearing,
not only did Judge George rule in opposition to the evidence presented on the issue
of causation, but also dismissed Mr. Whitear's claim for permanent total disability
benefits.
The Labor Commission has never granted Mr. Whitear a hearing on the issue
of whether he is entitled to permanent total disability benefits based upon the fact that
he suffers from asthma.

Asthma which was caused by the February 17, 1987

industrial accident.
The Constitution of the State of Utah and the Administrative Procedures Act
entitled Mr. Whitear to a hearing.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Whitear respectfully prays that this Court set aside the December 19, 1997
Order on Motion for Review, reinstate the April 20, 1995 Interim Order entered by
Judge Allen and remand this case to the Labor Commission for further proceeding
consistent with Judge Allen's April 20, 1995 Interim Order.
Dated this 14th day of May 1998.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of May 1998 I delivered two true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Mr. Whitear to the following:
Alan L. Hennebold
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Labor Commission

Stuart L. Poelman
77 West 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Brown & Root and
Highlands Insurance

Erie V. Boorman
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Employers' Reinsurance Fund
Dated this 14th day of
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ADDENDUM 1:

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-10

63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any
post-hearing papers permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time
required by any applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding
officer shall sign and issue an order that includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based
exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings
or on facts officially noted;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration;
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the
order available to aggrieved parties; and
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.
(2) The presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence,
and specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may be based solely on hearsay
evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing
interim orders to:
(a) notify the parties of further hearings:
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the
issues presented: or
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the
adjudicative proceeding.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-10. enacted by L.
1987, c h . 161, $ 266; 1988, c h . 72, § 20.
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ADDENDUM 2:

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-8

63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii), in all formal
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties
reasonable opportunity to present their positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer:
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly
repetitious:
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah;
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or
excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the
original document;
(iv> may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially
noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other
proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts
within the agency's specialized knowledge.
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is
hearsay.
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit
rebuttal evidence.
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at
the hearing.
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be
considered in reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.
(g.» The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense.
(hi Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the
agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that
the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect confidential
information disclosed at the hearing.
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing.
History: C. 1953. 63-46b-8, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, * 264: 1988, ch. 72, * 19. "
Cross-References. — Judicial notice. Utah
R. Evid. 201.

Privileges. Utah R. Evid. 501 et seq.
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ADDENDUM 3:

Constitution of Utah, Artie

I

Sec, 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
History: Const. 1896.
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ADDENDUM 4:

Constitution of Utah, Article 1 , §7

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
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ADDENDUM 5:

\ugust 7, 1987 Order

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 87000446

HAVEN WHITEAR

*
Applicant,

vs.
BROWN & ROOT, INC. and/or
HIGHLAND INSURANCE

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*
*

AND ORDER

*

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August 6,
1987 at 2:30 p.m. ofclock. Said hearing was pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by David
Bert Havas, Attorney at Law.
The defendants were
Attorney at Law.

represented

by Henry K. Chai,

At the time and place set for the evidentiary hearing, the
defendants, by and through counsel, notified the Administrative Law Judge that
they were accepting liability for an industrial accident sustained by the
applicant on March 10, 1987. On March 10, 1987, the applicant was drenched
with fyrquel 220, which leaked from a damaged hydraulic hose. The defendants
have accepted liability for that industrial accident and have also agreed to
pay all outstanding medical expenses to date incurred by the applicant. It
was also discussed by the parties that at the present time the file contains
insufficient evidence to support the applicant's claim of temporary total
compensation or possible permanent partial impairment as the result of the
industrial accident. The parties have agreed that they will consult and agree
upon a mutually acceptable physician to examine the applicant further. In the
event dispute develops, then such further proceedings will be had by the
Commission as are indicated.

0-H

ORDER
PAGE TWO

ORDER:
I I 1G THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of H*u/eu Whit ear x.* hereby
dismissed at this time, pending further medical evaluation, which shall be
paid for by the defendant.
The application for hearing shall serve as a
protection of rights, and in the event dispute develops such further
proceedings as are necessary will be convened by the Commission.
II IS FURTHER ORDERED that *JULIJ Motion lor Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Timothy C^fillen
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, this
yt%*
day of August, 1987.
ATTEST:

Lind'a J. Straatafrg
Commission ^e^retary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on August / . 1987 a copy of the
of
Joe Ramirez issued August ^7 **s mailed to
in the case
persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
laid
Haven Whitear
Box 131
Morgan, Utah 84050
David B. Havas
Attorney at Lav
2604 Madison Ave
Ogden, Utah 84401
Highlands Insurance
c/o Black, Nichols & Guiver
P.O. Box 2615
Salt Lake City,. Utah 84110
Henry K. Chai
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By
Sherry
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ADDENDUM 6-

April 2 0 , 1995 Interim Order

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 93-229
*

HAVEN WHITEAR,

*
*

Applicant,
VS.

*
*

BROWN & ROOT, INC. and/or
HIGHLANDS INSURANCE, EMPLOYERS
REINSURANCE FUND,

*
*
*

INTERIM ORDER

*

.Defendants,

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room- 334, Industrial Commission of
Utah, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, on February 22, 1994, at 10:00 o'clock
a. m. Said hearing was pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented
by Hans Scheffler, Attorney.
The defendants were
Poelman, Attorney.

represented

by

Stuart

The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented
by Erie Boorman, Attorney.
Following the hearing in this matter, the Presiding Law Judge
referred the_ file to a Medical Panel for its evaluation. The
Medical Panei Report was forwarded to the parties by certified
mail. The applicant, by and through counsel, filed Objections to
the Medical Panel Report for the failure of the Panel to attribute
any of the psychiatric impairment to the industrial accident of
February 17, 1987. Thereafter, the matter was scheduled for a
hearing on the applicants Objections.
On March 21, 1995 the
applicant, by and through counsel, withdrew his request for a
hearing on the Objections to the Panel Report, noting that the
medical evidence on the file did not sustain the Panel's finding of
pre-existing psychiatric impairment.
After reviewing the Medical Panel Report and the other medical
evidence contained on the file, I find that the Objection of the

HAVEN WHITEAR
ORDER
PAGE TWO

applicant is well founded/ As I review the psychiatric portion of
the Panel Report, I can find no evidence to support: -cne Panels—"
finding that the applicant had pre-exisring p^ychia-cric impaimteiTT:—ThSieluie, I adopt the panel's finding that rne applicant nas a b % —
permanent impairment due to depression, however, I take exception
to the Panel's finding that none of that impairment is due to the
industrial accident. Rather, I adopt the finding of Dr. Cali that
the applicant's depression is a.result of the industrial accident
of February 17, 1987. Accordingly, the applicant shall be entitled
to treatment for his depression on an industrial basis.
The applicant has also requested a tentative finding of
permanent total disability. After reviewing the file, it appears
the applicant is entitled to a tentative finding of permanent total
disability based on the findings of .the Panel as amended, • and in
view of the finding of disability since December 29, 1989 made by
Social Security. Accordingly, the applicant shall be referred to
the Division of Rehabilitation Services for their evaluation as
required by Section 67 of the Workers Compensation Act.

INTERIM ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Objections of the applicant
to the Medical Panel Report should be and the same are hereby
granted.
Accordingly, the defendants shall pay all medical
expenses incurred as the result of the industrial injury, including
but not limited to treatment for depression, in accordance with the
medical and surgical fee schedule of the Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the applicant is tentatively
permanently and totally disabled as the result of the industrial
accident of February 17, 1987, and is hereby referred to the
Division of Rehabilitation Services for its evaluation pursuant to
S35-1-67•
DATED this 20th day of April, 1995.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on April 20, 1995, a copy of the ..attached
Interim Order in the case of Haven Whitear was mailed to the
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Haven Whitear
Rt.2, Box 131
Morgan, UT 84050
Hans Scheffler, Esq.
311 South State, #180
SLC, Utah 84111
Stuart Poelman, Esq.
77 W. 200 S., #400
SLC, UT 84101
Erie Boorman, Esq.
ERF
P.O. 146611
SLC, UT 84114-6611
Black, Nichols & Guiver
P.O. 2615
SLC, UT 84110-2615

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

r\™m,~>/~
Tim Allen
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ADDENDUM 7:

July 3 1 , 1995 Order of Remand

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
HAVEN WEITEAR,

*

Applicant,

BROWN AND ROOT, INC., HIGHLAND
INSURANCE COMPANY and THE
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND,

*
*

ORDER OF REMAND

*
*
*

Case No, 93-0229

*

Defendants.

*

Brown and Root, Inc. and its workers' compensation insurano
carrier, Highland Insurance Company, (referred to jointly as "Brow
and Root" hereafter) ask The Industrial Commission of Utah t<
review the Administrative Law Judge's interim order regarding Have:
Whitear's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensatic:
Act.
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over thiMotion for Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Cod
Ann. §35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Whitear has filed a claim for permanent total disabilit
compensation alleging he is unable to work as a result of a
industrial injury suffered on February 17, 1987, while employed b
Brown & Root.
After an initial hearing, the ALJ referred the medical aspect
of Mr. Whitear's claim to a medical panel with instructions t
answer the following questions:
1. What is the permanent impairment due to the industria
accident of February 17, 1987;
2. Is the applicant's depression a result of the industria
accident of February 17, 1987;
3.
Does the applicant have asthma as a result of th
industrial accident;
4.
What is the permanent impairment due to pre-existin
conditions.

ORDER OF REMAND
HAVEN WHITEAR
PAGE TWO
On May 25, 1994, the medical panel reported to the ALJ that
Mr. Whitear suffered a 10% impairment from a pulmonary disorder
that was entirely due to his industrial accident. The medical
panel further reported that Mr. Whitear suffered a 5% impairment
from depression. As to the cause of such depression, the medical
panel stated:
There does not appear to be a direct causal relationship
between the exposure (to toxic substances at Brown &
Root) and his psychiatric status, which is interpreted as
being equally due to pre-existing and subsequent factors.
Mr. Whitear objected to the medical panel's conclusion
regarding the causes of his depression and the ALJ scheduled a
hearing on such objections. However, prior to hearing, Mr. Whitear
withdrew his request for hearing and argued instead that the
medical panel's report failed to identify any preexisting cause of
Mr. Whitear's depression.
Based upon Mr. Whitear's arguments, the ALJ canceled the
hearing that had been scheduled to address the medical panel's
report. Then, the ALJ rejected the medical panel's finding that
Mr. Whitear's depression was due to preexisting and subsequent
factors other than his industrial accident at Brown & Root.
Instead, the ALJ adopted the opinion of Dr. Cali, Mr. Whitear's
treating psychologist, that a causal connection existed between the
industrial accident and depression. The ALJ then issued an interim
order holding Mr. Whitear permanently and totally disabled and
referring him to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for
determination of his potential for rehabilitation.
DISCUSSION
Brown & Root asks the Industrial Commission to intervene in
this matter, despite the fact that the ALJ has not yet issued his
final decision on Mr. Whitear's claim.
While the Industrial
Commission is unaware of any statutory limit to its jurisdiction
over cases pending before its Administrative Law Judges, the
Industrial Commission also recognizes that its interference could
potentially disrupt the adjudicatory process.
Therefore, the
Industrial Commission will exercise jurisdiction over cases pending
before an ALJ only in certain unusual cases, this being one.

ORDER OF REMAND
HAVEN WKITEAR
PAGE THREE
With respect to Mr. Whitear's claim for disability
compensation under the workers' compensation system, the key issue
is the medical causes of his depression. Consequently, the ALJ's
preliminary determination on rj^at point will materially affect the
final outcome of the case.1 The Industrial Commission has reviewed
the medical evidence in tikis matter and concludes that further
information is required from the medical panel regarding the cause
of Mr. Whitear's depression.
In particular, the Industrial
Commission notes that the medical panel has expressed the opinion
that Mr. Whitear's depression does not appear to be causally
related to the exposure and without an explanation of this finding
by the medical panel, any final determination on the merits of Mr.
Whitear's claim may be flawed. In the judgment of the Industrial
Commission, this issue can be resolved most easily and efficiently
at this point in the proceeding.
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Whitear^scj.jjji.is remanded to
the ALJ. The ALJ is instructed to conductr^hearina on th^ ^d-iral
panel's report, particularly regarding the causes of Mr. Whitear's
depression. fThe ALJ may take such other action as is necessary and
appropriate to fully develop the record regarding the cause and
extent of Mr. Whitear's depression and related disability.
ORDER
The Industrial Commission hereby grants Brown & Root's motion
for review and remands this matter to the ALJ for further
proceedings consistent with this decision. It is so ordered.
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ADDENDUM 8:

Judge George's December 29, 1995 FAX transmission
re the limitation of the issues for the February 7, 1996
Hearing

FAX COVER SHEET
PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET; 2
DATE:

DECEMBER 29, 19*15

FROM: DON GEORGE
ADJUDICATION" DIVISION

TO:

FAX#:

530-6804

TEL#:

530-6865

FAX#:

TEL#:

SCHEFFLER. H.
POELMAN. S.

-521-3731
521-7965

531-6600
521-7900

RE:.

32222

HAVPN WHITPAB

~

MESSAGE: COUNSELORS--! REVIEWED THE 03JKCTIONS TO THE
REHAB SERVICES REPORT. & THE RESPONSE. IN SENWG THE REPORT OUT.
MY THOUGHT WAS THAT BY GETTING IT OUT PERHAPS WE COULD BE
ADVANCING ON BOTH TRACKS. HOWEVER. MR. POEL VIA N IS PERSUASIVE IN
POINTING OUT THAT IT IS LOGICAL TO FIRST HAVE THE CAUSAL CONNECTION
(if any) ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT & THE
DEPRESSION. IF NO CONNECTION IS SHOWN. THA T WILL LIKEL Y END THE
MA TTER. IF A CONNECTION IS SHO WN, AL THOUGH THiz DEFENDANTS CAN
BE AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP A RE-EMPlOYMENT PLAN. GET
A CONTRASTING VOC REHAB REPORT & HAVE A HEAFIKS, A TENAW/E
FINDING OF PTD CAN BE MADE IN THE INTERIM. SINCE t~HA T FINDING COULD
BE MADE A T THE CONCLUSION OF THE 2/07/9$ HEARWC, ON OBJECTIONS TO
THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT. THERE IS NO HARM IN fIC "EXPANDING THE
SCOPE OF THE HEARING TO INCLUDE OBJECTIONS TO THE REHAB SERVICES
REPORT. MR. SCHEFFLERS REQUEST IS DENIED. HCWi:VER. IF THE HEARING
RESULT IS FAVORABLE TO THE APPLICANT. MR. POELUANS LETTER MIGHT BE
A START FOR A RE-REFERRAL TO STATE REHAB WITH MORE SPECIFIC
QUESTIONS? WE'LL SEE WHA T THE HEARING BRINGS.
MR. SCHEFFLER. AS I LOOKED OVER THE FILE QLfCniY. I NOTED THAT

THE LAST HEARING NOTICE DID NOT HA VE DR. CALI COP.'XD AS HAD BEEN
DONE ON PRIOR SETTING NOTICES. I ASKED MS. MELE & SHE INDICATED SHE
HAD BEEN INFORMED IT WAS YOUR RESPONSIBIUT/ TO ARRANGE FOR YOUR
WITNESS TO BE HERE. THAT SEEMS RIGHT AS MR. CJ-U WILL NOT GET PAID
a
IF YOU DON'T BRING HIM.
'
THANK YOU GENTLEMEN!***'

CERTIFICA TE OF MAILING
I certify that I have mailed the attached FAX to the fc'.'owsng by first class
prepaid postage on the
day of DECEMBER, 1935:
HAVEN WHITEAR, ROUTE 2, BOX 131, MORGAN, UT C4CS0
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ADDENDUM 9:

Hearing transcript pages cited in Mr. Whitear's Brief

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

*

HAVEN WHITEAR,

* *
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Applicant,
vs.

Case No.' 93229
Deposition of:
HEARING ON ORDER OF
REMAND TO OBJECTIONS OF
-THE--ME D I.C AL-RERORT

BROWN & ROOT," INC.; * "
HIGHLANDS INSURANCE and
-EMP-LO-YERS-REINSURANCE-FUND}• '\ x : ~:.:d?: Defendants . ^-;^C:.)
*

* *

CERTIFIED COPY
. -** -s^r..-*. • 7->"*-'

'-' I " ^ J J ' B V I T REMEMBERED' t h a t

?:.:-mm m , m m m * • - . ; - ;

MOST

(801)

3 2 2-3742"^ v -^iS

. vv,^..,,.. .. : -^ ; :;4.rj
185 South State Street #380 ' v / ' f '
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

-REPORTERSUTAH'S

o n t h e 7 t h d a y o f : *f

CttTIFIED

ttPQlTliS

FIXM

93229.
MR. SCHEFFLER:

That sounds right, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SCHEFFLER:

That ultimately led to a

hearing, and on or about March 1st of 1994 Judge Alle
did refer the claim to the medical panel, and the
reason it was referred to a medical panel is obvious.
There was conflict in the medical evidence that was
presented to Judge Allen at the hearing.

Neither

party objected to the referral of the claim to the
panel.
The medical panel report at issue is dated
May 24, 1994.

I, on Mr. Whitear's behalf, filed a

timely objection to that report.

The defense never

filed an objection to the medical panel report, nor
did they seek an extension of time to file an
objection to the medical panel report.
The objection that we had to the medical
panel report was very limited, and it was limited to
this issue, and that is, what is the cause of
Mr. Whitear's depression?

The independent medical

report of Dr. McCann, the reports of Dr. Cali, and
even the medical panel all agree that Mr. Whitear is
suffering from depression, so whether or not he has

12

depression is a nonissue.

He has it.

The issue and

what we objected to was the causation.
The hearing which was scheduled —

and there

was a communication problem of some sort when
Mr. Poelman had his health problems —

didn't occur.

Subsequent to the hearing on March 17, 1995, I
consulted with Mr. Whitear, and in an effort to move
this case along, because it is so old, I withdrew our
request for hearing.
Again, Mr. Poelman did not object to my
withdrawing of that request.

I reserved the issue,

and that is the causation of the depression, but I
withdrew the request for hearing and asked Judge Allen
to enter an order based upon the medical evidence that
was before him; again, Dr. McCann's reports, Dr.
Cali's records, the medical panel reports, and all the
other medical records from the International Jewish
Center, all of the records that were submitted in the
original evidentiary hearing.
On April 20th, over a month —

1995, over a

month after I withdrew my request for a hearing, Judge
Allen entered his interim order making a tentative
finding of permanent total disability and referring
Mr. Whitear appropriately to the state rehab for
evaluation.

13
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It wasn't until May 9, 1995 —

keep in mind

I withdrew my request for hearing in March.

It wasn't

until May 9 of 1995 that Mr. Poelman filed an
objection to Judge Allen's report, and that objection
basically outlined what he's saying here today.
we want to question the doctors.
that.

There's a conflict.

Gee,

We're entitled to do

There may or may not be a

conflict, and he may be entitled to, but he has waived
any time, to do that.
And it is interesting to note, one of the
objections stated is that they lost the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses, specifically, I believe,
Dr. Cali, that if they can't cross-examine, they want
time to take his deposition.
Well, defense counsel had scheduled Dr.
Cali's deposition in August of 1993, and it was
defense counsel who cancelled the deposition.
wasn't us.

It wasn't Dr. Cali.

It

It was defense

counsel, and now they come back years later and say,
"Gee, we can't question him. w
For all of those reasons, I believe that
this hearing should not be held, that you should in
essence reinstate Judge Allen's interim order and
proceed on that basis.
Now, I don't want to go forward -- I mean,

14
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excuse me.

I do want to go forward.

I want to

reserve my objections, but I have witnesses here
today, and I want to put the evidence on so that if
there is a subsequent motion .for review or an appeal
that I don't want to have to come back and have
another hearing and bring these witnesses in again.
Quite frankly, Mr. Whitear can't afford to
keep paying Dr. Cali, who is very cooperative and
reasonable, but nonetheless —
paid.

and he's entitled to be

He's taken time out of his day, so I do want to

go forward today, but I do want to make sure that my
objections to this whole hearing and the reasons for
my objections are on the record.
I'd like to make one correction to the
representation Mr. Poelman made.

Mr. Whitear is

getting Social Security disability benefits.

The

Social Security Administration has found him to be
totally disabled as of December 29, 1989, and the
primary diagnosis for that disability is asthma, not
depression, unlike Mr. Poelman represented to you.
MR. POELMAN:

Your Honor, I think Counsel's

statement does refresh my recollection with respect to
the Social Security findings.

I think you'll find

that the actual documentary basis for the disability
was based on the schedules of disability under Social

15
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Security, and they all related to the depression.
They did not relate to the asthma, and there was no
record in the file that noted —

and you'll have to

look at the full Social Security file on that, I
think.

And is that in the record?

I think it's in

the record.
THE COURT:
it.

It's there, but I didn't read

Explain that to me again.
MR. POELMAN:

the basis upon —

You're correct in

—

Right, that if you'll review

in the Social Security file, the

basis upon which disability was determined, this is an
itemization of factors and so forth that they look to,
and they have to find at least, I think, three major
factors in order to find their —
forth.

disability and so

Those factors which were found by Social

Security all related to the depression, and there is
nothing in that record that supports a disability
based on the asthma.
MR. SCHEFFLER:
THE COURT:

Surely.

MR. SCHEFFLER:
record.

May I approach, Your Honor?

This should be in the

If it's not, I'll offer it now.

(Inaudible)

also indicates this is a pre-1988 case, so
technically, we don't have to meet the standards and
the requirements of Social Security.

I think the fact

16
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1
2
3
4
5

conclusions you came to in your medical panel report?
A

No.

I read over them two or three times.

This worries me to come to court, and I have no reason
to change my mind.
Q

So it is your opinion, I take it, that

6

whatever depression, though it may be slight, was not

7

caused by the exposure at his workplace?
A

8

That's correct.

9
10

MR. POELMAN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

the witness for cross-examination.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SCHEFFLER:

13
14

I hand

Mr. Scheffler?
Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SCHEFFLER:
Q

15

Dr. Burgoyne, will you concede that an

16

individual who suffers an injury on the job, besides

17

the physical injury, that that may also cause

18

depression?
A
Injury on the job could cause depression,

19
20

yes.

21

Q

It can?

22

A

It can.

23

Q

24
25

However, in this case you concluded it

didn't?
A

I concluded it wasn't a very big factor

39
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1

contributes to the continuing depression.

2

MR. SCHEFFLER:

Now what?

So then can we not say that

3

then the incident, the accident, then is a factor, if

4

that's true?

5

THE COURT:

Well, then ask that question.

6

MR. SCHEFFLER:

Okay.

7

Q

You understand that?

8

A

Okay.

9

Q

Your statement that the ongoing legal

Ask the question.

10

dispute between Mr. Whitear and his former employer,

11

the insurance company, is a factor in his depression;

12

is that right?

13

A

It's a factor.

14

Q

Okay.

So if that is a factor, then is it

15

not true to say that the accident then in some way is

16

also a factor in causing his depression?

17
18
19

A

I would have to say yes, but —

are many things in life.
Q

Thank you.

well, there

Yes.

Another factor that you talked

20

about with Mr. Poelman is the loss of physical

21

ability.

22

fast he could run.

Mr. Whitear, I think you said, told you how

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

And you and I are in agreement that rodeo is

25

a physically demanding

—

50

MR. BOORMAN:

Your Honor, it appears to me

that Judge Allen attributed the disability to the
depression, and the motion for review dealt with that
as the disability.

And the motion to remand was —

is

clearly limited to whether or not the depression was
caused by the industrial exposure,
THE COURT:

Yeah.

I understand your

objection, and while I appreciate that, and
fortunately or unfortunately, as the case may be, the
Industrial Commission isn't here to guide me, so I'll
just have to wing it on my own.

Your objection is

overruled.
Q

(By Mr. Scheffler) During your high school

years, how would you characterize or how would you
describe Mr. Whitear's behavior in terms of —

did you

at any time notice signs, what you would perceive as
signs of depression?
A

I never saw anything that I would interpret

as depression.
Q

How would you describe his -- during those

years, his personality?

Would you describe that for

us?
A

I think he was a jovial, personable

gentleman who was arguably the most popular person in
the school*

181
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Q

Are you aware of the accident that occurred

on Haven's job when he was exposed to the chemicals?
A

I know very little about the accident.

Q

Have you had an opportunity to be with Haven

after this accident?
A

Not much.

time together.

Haven and I used to spend more

He used to initiate those times

together periodically.
Q

He doesn't call any more.

Let me ask you, in the times that you have

been together since the accident which occurred in
February of 1987, have you noticed a change in Haven's
personality or behavior?
A

Yes.

I think there's a notable change.

Q

And can you describe what you have observed

in terms of a change?
A

I think he's withdrawn.

he's, I think, depressed.

He's angry, and

And anhedonia would be a

good way to describe it, as was used earlier today.
Q

Was Haven angry before this accident?
MR. P0ELMAN:

Well, I'm going to —

well, go

ahead.
A

I don't think he had directed, continual,

frustrated anger before this accident.
Q

Okay.

How about withdrawn?

Was he

withdrawn before this?

182

A

No.

Q

Did you —• during the time that you've known

Haven, have you had an occasion to work with him?
A

We worked a lot together, yes.

Q

Where at?

A

We worked in Wyoming building an oil

refinery together.

We worked on his dairy.

THE COURT:

Give some dates along with

those, okay?
Q

Okay.

When did you work in Wyoming?

A

I think that would have been '83 or '84.

Q

Okay.

A

We worked a lot on the farm much earlier

than th at in the lat.e 70's.
Q

What kind of work did you do on the farm?

A

Haul hay, repair fences, milk cows, move

sprinkl er pipes, wha.tever was necessary, mostly
hauling h ay.
Q

Did you ever observe Haven having any

difficu It doing any of those farm chores?
A

No.

Havert could do them better than anyone

else.
MR. SCHEFFLER:

At this point I don't have

any furth er questions.
THE COURT:

Cross?

183
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don 7 t have any further questions.
I don't have any quest ions.

MR. POELMAN:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

You> m a y step down.

Step out into the hall, please.
Am I free to go now?

THE WITNESS:
MR. SCHEFFLER:
MR. POELMAN:
THE COURT:

Sure.
No objection.

You're excused.

Thank y<ou.

Step up here, please.
CRAIG WHITEAR,
1 *

'call*ad as a witness on behalf of the appl icant , being
duly sworn, was examined and testifie d as folliDWS :
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SCHEFFLER:
Q

Would you please state your name?

A

Crai.g Whitear.

Q

What's your relationship to Haven?

A

I'm his older brother,

Q

How much older?

A

Seven years.

Q

Where do you live right now 7

A

I live on the family farm, 4060 West 4000

North in Peterson, Morgan County.
Q

Is that where Haven lives?

A

No.
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Q

Where does he live?

A

He lives in the basement of my dad's house,

if you can call it living.
Q

Is that also in Morgan?

A

Yes.

Q

Mr. Whitear, have you been here all day?

A

Since 15 after eight.

Q

And you have heard the testimony of Dr.

That's one block from my house.

Burgoyne, Dr. McCann?
A

Uh-huh.

Q

Is that a yes?

A

Yes.

Q

Trying to record everything, so I want to

make sure it's all clear.

Do you recall the testimony

first elicited by Mr. Poelman and then by myself from
Dr. Burgoyne about a list, literally a laundry list of
things that may cause depression?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

What I'd like you to —

I would like to go

through that list with you, and tell me about Haven.
The first item on the list was school, specifically
that Haven may be depressed in part because he was
getting poor grades in high school.

Did he get bad

grades in high school?
A

They weren't A's, but he enjoyed school.

He
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enjoyed the association with his
MR- POELMAN:
responsive.

—

Object to the answer, not

He's asked about the grades in high

school.
THE COURT:
Q

Okay.

Sustained.

Tell me about what kind of student

Haven was besides the grades he received.
A

What kind of student?

Q

Yeah.

A

He enjoyed going to school, not for the

Did he like going to school?

study aspect.
Q

Why?

For what aspect did he enjoy going to

school?
A
fun.

To associate with his friends and to have
School was a stage.

Q

Was Haven a popular student in high school?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you know whether or not Haven went to

I'm sorry.

—

Did Haven graduate from high school?

A

Yes, he did.

Q

From Morgan High School?

A

Yes, he did.

Q

Did he graduate on time with his class?

A

No, he didn't.

Q

When did he graduate?
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1
2

He

A

One of the reasons he didn't graduate
MR. POELMAN:

3
4
5
6
7

graduated, if I recall, a year later.
—

I'm going to object to this on

the grounds of lack of foundation.
Q
Were you living with Haven at the time he
was in high school?
A
I was living in Peterson at the time.
Q

Were you aware of him going to high school?

9

A

Yes, I was.

10

Q

H O W often would you see him while he was in

8

11
12

high school on average time per week?
A

I would see him come and go every day from

13

school because I run the dairy on the farm, and he has

14

to walk by the dairy to get to the house.
Q
And would you also communicate with Haven

15
16
17
18
19.
20
21
22
23

during this time period?
A
Yes, I would. I would have him help me on
the farm.
Q
okay.

Did you go to Haven's high school

graduation?
N O , I didn't.
A
Q
DO you know i f he went t o t h e h i g h s c h o o l
graduation

24

A

25

Q

ceremony?
I don't r e c a l l .
D O you recall the year he graduated from
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high school?
A

Just by subtraction or addition, so it would

have to be '77.
Q

It's your testimony that he graduated a year

later than the rest of his class?
A

Yes.

Q

Was he held back?

A

Yes, he was.

Q

During the time that Haven was in high

school, did you observe any signs of depression?
A

No.
MR. POELMAN:

I'm going to object to the

question and ask the answer be stricken on the grounds
that he's not qualified to clinically diagnose
depression.
THE COURT:
Q

Sustained.

Would you describe —

during the years in

high school describe for me Haven's personality.
A

It was fun.

It was exciting.

He enjoyed

life, and he enjoyed being with his friends.

One of

the big reasons he went back to school is to show the
teachers who had prejudice against him because he
goofed off in their classes that he could do it.
wasn't afraid of the establishment, quote, quote.

He
One

of the teachers literally went into the faculty
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meeting one day

—

MR. POELMAN:

Your Honor, it's going beyond

the question and beyond the expertise of the witness.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

MR. SCHEFFLER:
testimony.

This is not professional

This is observations.
THE COURT:

Wait, wait.

MR. SCHEFFLER:
THE COURT:

Just a second.

MR. POELMAN:
THE COURT:

Maybe he was there.

Well,, there's no foundation.
If we continue to allow this

witness to go way beyond the question, we're going to
be here until midnight.

Ask him a question and get an

answer to it and then go on.

You know, he's

volunteering lots of information about this, that, and
the other thing.
If you want to explore some of those things,
then ask him a question specifically about that.

I'm

assuming that you're aware of them, but the volunteer
statements are going to take us forever to deal with.
MR. SCHEFFLER:

We have a right to present

our evidence.
THE COURT:

You have a right to present your

evidence.
MR. SCHEFFLER:

And that's what we're trying
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to do.
THE COURT:

I assume you know what the

evidence is, and you will ask questions accordingly.
I don't want him to volunteer.
question.

Stop.

Ask the next question.

MR. SCHEFFLER:
school, and Mr. Poelman
THE COURT:
experience.

Just answer the

I've asked him about high
—

High school is a four year

I don't want to *go through four years of

experience today.
MR. SCHEFFLER:
all due respect.
doesn't matter.

Well, we may have to, with

If you like that or not, that
We may have to.

These doctors here

behind me have placed great weight on these supposed
poor grades and that supposed depression, and there is
absolutely no basis for their opinions.

These are

people who lived with Mr. Whitear, who saw him, who
don't have to rely upon reports from other people.
THE COURT:
questioning.
voice it.
Q

Mr.. Scheffler, proceed with your

If Mr. Poelman has an objection, he'll

I'll rule on it.

We'll go on from there.

Describe for me Haven's personality during

the four years he was in high school.
MR. POELMAN:
THE COURT:

It's been asked and answered.
Sustained.
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MR. SCHEFFLER:
Q

All right.

Mr. Poelman and his doctors have made a

great dea 1 about the supposed conflict between your
stepmothe r and Haven.

Did you hear that testimony

this morning?
MR. POELMAN:

Your Honor, I object to that

question on the grounds that it's referred to
doctors."

n

my

It's not my doctors.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

Go ahead,»

Q

Did you hear that testimony?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

And I —

A

He remarried in December of 1980.•

Q

Describe for me the relationship —

I

when did your father remarry?
i

I assume

she lives with your father still.
A

Yes.

Q

How close to your home?

A

One block away.

Q

Describe -- and Haven lives with his father

and stepm<other right now?
A

Yes, he does.

Q

Describe for me the relationship between

stepmother and Haven.
A

I have never heard her say one mean or

degrading comment about any of my father's children.
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Q

I know you haven't read the records, but

there are some notes in the records that —

where

Haven has indicated that there is some stress between
himself and your stepmother, but you've not observed
that.
A

If it's stress, it's not from her.

Q

Okay.

Thank you.

During Haven's high

school years, did he work at all, to your knowledge?
A

He worked on the farm.

Q

Would that be for you?

A

It would be for me or for dad.

until about —

At that time

until mom's death, me and my father

worked jointly on the dairy.
Q

Okay.

So during high school he would have

worked for you and your father?
A

Correct.

Q

Can you describe the kind of work that Haven

did on the farm during that time period?
A

Haven did everything that a farm boy is

required to do.
Q

Which means?

A

Haul hay, milk cows, dig fence post holes,

chase cows from morning until night.

In the summer it

would be an average of a 16 hour day.

In the winter,

before and after school.

200
MERIT REPORTERS

Q

During his high school years when he worked

on the farm, either before or after school or in the
summer, did he have any difficulty doing-that work?
A

No.

He could stand and lift a bale, 70

pound bale of hay, take it from the ground and throw
it the equivalent of nine feet in the air to the top
layer of hay.

That was a contest that the brothers

always had every hay season.
Q

Between —

let me interrupt you now.

A

Between me, my brother Ron, and Haven, who

could throw hay the highest.
Q
school?

How about after Haven graduated from
Did he ever work with you or on your father's

farm after high school?
A

Yes, he did.

He would

—

Q

When -- let me slow you down.

When did he

work on the farm after high school?
A

After high school, he would work —

be around mother's death.

it would

So it would be 1980,

and 'til his accident.
Q

In 1987?

A

In 1987.

He would work when he wasn't

working somewhere else.
Q

And doing the same .kinds of jobs?

A

Same kind of —

it was his joy to work my
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hired hands into the ground.
Q

Did.you pay him when he worked for you?

A

No. -He had another 1 job that paid"far better

than I could pay him, and I would ask.him —

if I had

trouble with a hay crew, I'd say, "Haven, could you
come out and speed these guys up?

I got to get the

hay in before it rains."
Q

And would he come out and do that for you?

A

Yes, he would.

Q

Any problems doing that for you?

A

No.

He enjoyed it.

He loved it.

His ego

was to work a 16-year-old kid right in the ground
until that kid couldn't pick up a bale, and then he
would say, "When you get big enough like me, maybe
you'll be able to handle this."
Q

Now, let me ask you, you're aware of the

accident that occurred?
A

Yes, I am.

Q

February of '87.

A

I wasn't there.

Q

Have you had occasion to work with Haven

You weren't there.

since that accident?
A

Once.

Q

When?

A

It was the summer of that year.
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1

Q

So summer of 1987?

2

A

Correct.

3

Q

And where were you working?

4

A

On the farm.

5

Q

With Haven?

6

A

I asked Haven if he would come out and help

7

j

this hay crew get going because the weather was bad.

8

Q

Same kind of job?

9

A

Same kind of job, and he was tickled to do

11

Q

And did he come out?

12

A

He came out.

13

Q

Did he try to do it?

14

A

He tried.

15

Q

What happened?

16

A

By the time he got the tractor started, the

10

j

it.
1

17

heat of the day, the dust from the hay and the

18

alfalfa, he hadn't lifted five bales.

19_ —broke a sweat, he started to cough.
20

clammy.

21

He laid down.

22
23

Q

He couldn't breathe.

As soon as he

He became

He went in the house.

Twenty-four hours later he got up.

Did you ever witness anything like that

before the February '87 accident?

24

A

Never.

25

Q

Another factor that Dr. Burgoyne considered

203
MERIT

REPORTERS

was the death of your mother.

She died in 1980?

A

Correct.

Q

How did Haven deal with that loss?
MR. POELMAN:

I'm going to object to that on

the grounds that it's beyond the expertise of this
witness.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

She was my mother, too.
Wait just a second.

MR. POELMAN:
MR. SCHEFFLER:
Q

He's diagnosing how

—

Let me rephrase it.

How did you observe Haven act after your

mother passed away in 1980?
A

He hurt, just like I hurt.

Q

It is painful.

I appreciate that, but can

you describe for me how you observed Haven hurt
A

The only

Q

—

A

Okay.

—

—

when your mother passed away?
The only visual effect was actually

at the funeral itself, and he was teary eyed, but he
is -- he was no different a week later than he was a
week before.
Q

Before her death?

A

Correct.

Q

How often do you see Haven now?

A

If I can catch him when he comes out of the
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basement, I won't see him once a month.

If I initiate

the visit, then I'll check on him once a week, but
he's reclusive.
Q

Let me just stop you.

So you see him once a

week maybe?
A

Yes.

Q

Have you observed the change in Haven's

personality and behavior from the time before the 1987
accident to after?
A

He used to come out and harass my hay crew

because they couldn't throw hay as high as he could or
as fast as he could.

He could unload a load of hay of

a hundred bales in four minutes.

That means you put a

bale of hay on a loader one after another every two to
three seconds, and he could continue that until the
load of hay was gone.
After the accident, he was unable to do any
of that.

He no longer came out and teased and

harassed my hay crew because -he had nothing to brag
about.
Q

He could no longer participate.
Let me —

was there a change in the

relationship from the time before the accident between
yourself and Haven to the time after the accident?
A

It became -- I guess the word is reclusive

or shy off.

Before when I would come up to him, he
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would —

if he had time, he'd ask, "You got something

for me to do?"

Now it's hello at best.

There is

nothing for him to talk about.
Q

Have you observed any other changes?

You

mentioned the work habit and the reclusiveness.

Have

you noticed any other changes in his personality or
behavior from the time before the accident in '87 to
the time after the accident in 1987?
A

My best comparison would be that he looks

like a whipped puppy.
Q

What do you mean by that?

A

Like a puppy's interested in you and comes

up and jumps up on your leg and wants to associate
with you.

Afterward, after the continual failure of

not being able to do the things he used to do, he used
to go out and work

—

MR. POELMAN:
responsive.

I object to it.

THE COURT:
Q

Your Honor, the answer is not

Sustained.

Just describe what he used to do before the

accident in 1987, what kind of activities.
mentioned work.
A

You've

Was Haven an outgoing person?

Haven would work all day, and then he would

go out and go with his friends and associate.
would participate with other people.

He

He would
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participate with my crew.
my —

He would associate with

with the hired hands.
Q

Okay.

A

He would come and play with my children.

Q

How about after the accident?

Does he come

play with your kids?
A

Not like he used to.

Q

Does he come harass your crew?

A

No, not at all.

Q

Does he come and offer to work any more?

A

He can't.

Q

Does he go out and socialize with his

He doesn't.

friends the way he used to?
A

No.
MR. SCHEFFLER:

I don't believe I have any

further questions at this time, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Mr. Poelman?

MR. POELMAN:
THE COURT:

I have no questions.
You indicated that Haven had

been held back at school.

What do you mean, held back

at school?
THE WITNESS:

One of the reasons he was held

back is because a teacher went into the faculty room.
THE COURT:
story.

I'm not interested in the

I asked you a question about, he was held
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called as a witness on behalf of the applicant, being
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SCHEFFLER:
Q

Would you please state your name?

A

Brent Bohman.

Q

How do you know Mr. Whitear?
MR. POELMAN:

Excuse me.

I didn't get the

THE WITNESS:

Brent Bohman, B-O-H-M-A-N.

MR. POELMAN:

Thank you.

name.

A

I grew up in the summers and spent time in

Morgan County, virtually every Christmas and Easter
and sch ool holidays, for most —

I would say from when

I was b orn until after I graduated from graduate
school.
Q

Where did you go to graduate school?

A

Hastings College of Law.

Mr. Haven Whitear

grew up on a dairy farm, and I spent my time when I
was in Morgan County on a cattle ranch that were very
closely
Q

Are they adjacent farms?

A

They're not adjacent.

Our lower farms are

adjacen t in some respects, but our upper range and the
dairy i tself have some land in between them.

They're

210
MERIT REPORTERS

very cl ose in proximity.
Q

They're both in Peterson.

Did you know Haven when he was going to high

school?
A

I have known Haven since I have earliest

memories of being a person.
Q

I guess the answer is yes?

A

I knew Haven before he went to

kindergarten.
school.

I knew Haven when he went to grammar

I knew Haven when he went to high school, and

I have :known Haven since then.
Q

Okay.
THE COURT:

Take a break for a minute.

Mr. Poelman, Mr. Scheffler, if you'll come forward,
please.
MR. POELMAN:

Thank you.

(Discussion held off the record.)
THE COURT:

Back on the record.

The purpose

of that departure from the courtroom was to make both
counsel aware, Mr. Bohman, that you and I have had
contact previously on both a professional basis, as
well as occasional acquaintance-type conversations.
THE WITNESS:

That is correct.

I struggled

for a while, however, to put your name to your face.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Having disclosed that

and eve:rybody seems comfortable with it.

—

Is that
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correct, Mr. Scheffler?
MR. SCHEFFLER:
THE COURT:
MR. POELMAN:
THE COURT:
Q

Yes,

Mr. Poelman?
That'-s correct.
You may proceed.

(By Mr. Scheffler) You are a licensed

attorney, Mr. Bohman?
A

I am.

Q

Do you still practice?

A

I do.

Q

Let's go back to the high school years when

you knew Haven.
the —

Would you —

take an average week —

how frequently during
would you see him

during the high school years?
A

In the wintertime when I wasn't on a school

vacation, I would not see him.

In the summer times I

would see him multiple times any given week.

To

explain that, Haven's family and my family all had
brothers the same ages, and in a rural community we
were the closest families that had kids our similar
age, so we all associated with each other.
Q

Did you work together?

A

Yes.

I would do work on the Whitear dairy,

and Haven would do work on our ranch.

We would haul

hay for a him, and his family would help us come haul
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1
2

hay, dep ending on who had hay down.
Q

We have had descriptions in what is involved

3

in hay h auling, so let me just ask you., did you ever

4

observe during your high school years Haven having any

5

difficulty doing that kind of work?

6

A

No.

Haven excelled at that type of work.

7

Any type of physical work Haven was pretty good at.

8

He enjoy ed it.

9

Q

Let's go post high school.

What's your

10

relationship or your association from graduating high

11

school t(D 1987, in that time period?

12

A

Between graduating from high school and

|

13

1987, Haven and I were on different pa ths.

14

pregraduate education path, and I went to school and

15

graduate school, whereas Haven chose not to pursue

16

that path.

17

physical labor type of activities.

18

for a period of time in those latter y ears that you

JL9
20
21
22

I was on a

Haven continued -- was emp loyed in more
He was a roughneck

speak of
Q

Did you during that time period have any

contact with Haven?
A

We continued to be —

we con tinued to

J

23

maintain our friendship, and we continued to socialize

24

frequently during that time period.

25

Q

During that time period, how would you
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describe Haven's personality?
A

I would describe Haven's personality from

the high school time period, if we're post high school
to that time period, as outgoing, energetic.
he had a zest for life.
was an energetic person.

I think

He was not a lazy person.

He

He was a person who did not

shirk from physical labor but actually enjoyed it.
was —

He

he had a sense of humor.
He was a very popular person.

popular with women.
his age.

He was

He was popular with other males

Haven was probably during that time period

the most popular person in the county for his age
group.
Q

Sure.

Mr. Bohman.

Since 1987 —

well, let me backtrack,

You're aware of the accident that

occurred in February of 1987 while Mr. Whitear was at
work?
A

I was aware of the accident after the fact.

Q

You weren't there, obviously.

A

Within that general time frame I was aware

of the accident.

He spoke to me about it.

At the

time of the accident, which I believe was around 1986,
I was a licensed attorney in the state.
Q

You were?

A

I was.

I graduated and moved here in 1984,
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and during, I would say the first three years after
the accident, not immediately after, but two or three
years after, he did call me regarding that accident.
Q

Did you —

let's take the time period from

February 1987 to now.

How would you characterize your

relationship with Haven for that time period?
A

I would have to break that time period up.

I would say between the time I moved here in 1984,
when I was admitted to the bar here, and 1990, 1992,
we continued, to a decreasing extent, to socialize
together.

And I would say in the last five years my

contact with Mr. Whitear has been much more
infrequent.
Q

Okay.

you outlined.

Let's take the first time period that
How frequently would you see or

socialize with Haven?
A

That time period I would be employed as an

attorney, and during periods of that time I actually
lived on my ranch, and during other periods of time I
maintained residence here, sometimes at my brother's
and sometimes not.

I would say that it would -- it

had decreased in the first part of the time period to
several times a year.
Q

Did you observe during that first time

period a change in Haven's personality and behavior
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from pre-1987?
A

I observed a change in —

I observed a

change -- your time frame analysis doesn't fit exactly
how I testify.
Q

Well, let me just ask you this.
MR. POELMAN:

Well, let him answer the

question.
MR. SCHEFFLER:
MR. POELMAN:

Pardon?
Are you going to let him

answer the question?
THE WITNESS:

I'm happy to answer the

question.
Q

Go ahead.

A

Postaccident through the present period, I

have observed a marked change in Mr. Whitear from
preaccident personality, interests, the extent of his
outgoingness.
Q

Describe it for us.

A

I would describe the change as being --

whereas, prior to 1986 Mr. Whitear was a fairly happy
person, a person who joked, who was outgoing, who
would come by my house when I was there at my ranch
and ask me to go out and have a beer or do something
with him, to a person who became reclusive, does not
joke like he used to, does not have the same
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personality in any regard that he used to have,
withdrawn.
And my contact with him during this —
if you want to take —
and '90 and '95.

and

I split it from '86 to '90

To the extent I have had contact

with Mr. Whitear, say from '90 to present, most of
that contact has been legal in nature, not specific to
this case, but when he would call me with respect, for
instance, children that he hasn't seen that he might
want to see, and where he would express
disillusionment with the fact that he doesn't have
money to pursue legal actions.
And usually those conversations would be
where he tried to do something but didn't have the
resources to do it, and then he would call me after
having paid an attorney, for instance, $400 and
have -- and not have achieved a result and call me to
see if there is anything I could do to it.
I am not a psychologist. " I am not a
psychiatrist, so I couldn't opine as to his mental
state, but I would say he was very -- from
observations, I would say he was very withdrawn, very
reclusive, very -- in some respects embarrassed.

In

some respects, the best word I could use for it is
frustrated.

Most of the conversations I had during
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this period would focus on lack of resources and lack
of money to do anything to effectuate a purposeful
life.
We specifically had conversations as friends
regarding whether he could get employment and try to
better his life, and we talked about things that
prohibited that.

He would talk about his inability to

work on his family's farm, that he couldn't haul hay,
that he couldn't maintain certain types of things.

it

was conversations in that nature, and they were rare.
Frankly, they were rare.
I have not seen much of Haven in the last
five or six years.

The last time I talked to Haven

before this for any extent was, last year when this
hearing was going to heppen, he called and asked if I
would appear.

And I think I've talked to him twice

since then when he called me and asked me to appear.
And one of those conversations had to do with the fact
the state is seeking —

the state on behalf of a woman

who is alleged to have his child is seeking —
filed a civil action.

or has

And he asked me if I could help

him on that, and I agreed to do that.
Q

A paternity action?

A

It's a paternity action with claims for

reimbursement to the state for payment of welfare
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moneys to the mother of the child.

And I don't

normally do that, but I agreed to help Haven on that.
And I am the attorney or record on that , and so I
think I've had three conversations with Haven this
last year •
MR. SCHEFFLER:
questions

I don't have any further

.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. POELMAN:
Q

Do you deem yourself to be a close friend of

the family?
A

I deem my family and the Whit ear family to

be close friends.
Q

Yes.

Now, what —

you talked about trying

to assist Haven on a paternity action.

Is that

something that's ongoing?
A

Yeah.

It was filed -—

I think it was filed

a couple months ago.
Q

I see.

And had you represent ed him in the

prior paternity suit?
A

I do not recollect having rep resented him in

a prior p aternity suit.
Q

Did you represent him in any other prior

legal act ion?
A

A couple things have been mentioned here
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Q
him.

I realize you disagree on that issue with
It's just that you made a statement of sometimes

an event happens.

There is a consequence, a

reaction.
A

All the time.

That's what life's about.

Things happen to us and we react.

We learn from it.

When we find we don't want to beat our heads against
something any more, we do something else.

A

prosecutor may become a judge.
Q

Could that happen?

A

(Indecipherable.)

Q

So then it's your opinion that you cannot

identify the cause of Haven's depression.

Is that

right?
A

I cannot identify specific —

specific cause for his depression.

a single,

My report

indicates that personality factors are probably
significant, a contributor, but there are other people
with these same kind of traits that don't develop this
kind of depression.

Again, I can't explain why Haven

is as depressed as he is.

He's profoundly depressed.

It has persisted for a prolonged period of time, and I
think he's got a real problem, and I'm really
sympathetic with him.

You may not think so, but I

am.
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please?

I mean, what portion of the record doesn't

bear him out?

If you ever make any findings, I'd like

to have specifics on that,

I'd also like to note for

the record that at no time did you step out in the
hallway and see him use his medication, which might
explain why you didn't see him coughing.
THE COURT:

That may well be.

MR. SCHEFFLER:

If you want people coughing

in your courtroom, Your Honor, from now on I will
instruct all my clients not to take their medications
before they appear before you.
THE COURT:

I appreciate your testimony, Mr.

Scheffler.
MR. SCHEFFLER:

It's not testimony.

It's a

statement of fact.
THE COURT:
particular, then.

Okay.

Let's give a specific and

Both in the medical records and in

his representations to the doctor the specific
statement was that his sex life is essentially shot.
Sexual function is down.

He tries to have sex, it

gives him asthma.

That jrs out of the medical

panel report.

Okay.

I don't see a particular page number on

it, but it's in Dr. Burgoyne's addendum.
Now, I find that not at all to be the
circumstance.

He testified as well that his sex life
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has not been very good since 2-17 of '87, the date of
the industrial accident.

Well, it's kind of

interesting that after that point he managed to
miraculously conceive two other children.

It doesn't

appear to me from that that his sex life is impaired,
nor does it appear to me from that that his social
life is impaired at all.
MR. SCHEFFLER:
is clear.

Let me make sure the record

You're saying that somebody who has

intercourse two times in the course of nine years has
a satisfying sex life.

Is that your finding, Your

Honor?
THE COURT:

Is that what I said?

MR. SCHEFFLER:

Well, you've only identified

two times where he could have possibly had sexual
intercourse, and so I just want to make sure the
record is clear that that's what your finding is.
THE COURT:

Well

MR. POELMAN:

—

Well, Your Honor, are we in

the posture here of debating this with you or arguing
this with you?
THE COURT:

It appears to be.

He asked for

some specific examples, so for the record I'll point
that out.
MR. SCHEFFLER:

I want specific findings.
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That'.s why I'm asking these things.
THE COURT:

And I'm giving them to you.

In

addition, both of the doctors who came on for the
defendants have indicated that they are essentially
very much surp rised at the support of family and
friends, and I don't think that can be disregarded.
By their observation or by what has transpired here
today, there's lots of people that are supporting him,
and once again , that runs counter to his
representations to us here today, as well as to the
doctors, that he is withdrawn.
Now, the purpose of this hearing basically
today was to d eal with the remand as to whether the
depression was the cause or was caused by the
industrial accident.

And I finally conclude that

that's not the case at all, that there is not a
preponderance of evidence in -support of the conclusion
that there was a medically caused connection between
the industrial accident and his depression, and
therefore, claims for perm and total disability that
was made in th is case is dismissed on that ground.
MR. SCHEFFLER:

Your Honor, what about the

asthma?
THE COURT:

Will you give me just a minute?

MR. SCHEFFLER:

Yes.
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MR. SCHEFFLER:

Payment of medical bills.

I

didn't present any evidence, since it wasn't an issue,
as to causation, but I think there's a prior order
from 1989 whereby the defense is required to pay all
reasonable medical expenses related to the asthma, and
I would

—
THE COURT:

And as to the asthma I would

agree all the medical expenses there should be paid.
THE COURT:
MR. POELMAN:
THE COURT:

Any questions, Mr. Poelman?
I don't believe so.
Okay.

Thank you.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.)
*

*

*

Original t r a n s c r i p t submitted t o Mr. S c h e f f l e r .
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ADDENDUM 10:

August 18, 1995 report from Utah State Office of
Rehabilitation

Utah State Office
of Rehabilitation
Blaine Petersen
Executive Director
Division of
Rehabilitation
Services
Donald R. Uchida
Director

August 18, 1995
Honorable Judge Timothy C Allen
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East, 300 S. 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
RE:

Haven Whitear

Dear Judge Allen:

Ogden District
856 24th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
Voice/TDD
(801)399-9231
FAX
(801)625-0114

Haven Whitear made application for services through the
Division of Rehabilitation July 10, 1995 and we gathered
medical information on him to determine whether or not he
could benefit from services of our agency.
Mr. Whitear suffers from severe asthma and his condition
has put a lot of restrictions on him as to the types of
work that he can and cannot do. Environmental factors
such as fumes, dust, smoke, and vapor associated with
some types of work exacerbate his condition. Because of
these restrictions, it was felt that the client should
undergo a vocational evaluation to determine his
aptitudes and interests and to better assist him in
finding a new career since he can no longer do the type
of work that he had done previously because of the above
environmental factors.
After receiving the results of the vocational evaluation,
Haven and I sat down and discussed his situation. It was
felt by the client that because of the severe respiratory
condition, including asthma and shortness of breath,
reduction of physical capacity with reference to heavy
lifting and carrying, weakness of extremities and being
susceptible to environmental influences that are
associated with most work areas to some degree, he
probably could not benefit from Rehabilitation services
at this point in time.

Utah State Board
of Education
Applied Technology
Education
Scott W. Bean
Chief Executive Officer

•

•«•

Haven Whitear
August 18, 1995
Page two

After evaluating this client's overall*'"situation and the
number and severity of limitations placed upon him, I
would have to agree with Haven that he would not be able
to benefit from our services. It is unlikely that his
condition will improve enough at this point to make him
feasible for Rehabilitation Services.
If you have questions, or require more specific
information, please feel free to contact me at 399-9231.
Sincerely,

i

r./r

lita E.M. Carver, M.S., CRC
Rehabilitation Counselor
AEMC:rw
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ADDENDUM 11:

Social Security Disability Determination & Transmittal form
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ADDENDUM 12:

Judge George's February 7, 1995 FAX transmission re
drafting of the Findings of Fact

FAX COVER SHEE1
PAGES INCLINING COVER SHEET: 1
DATE:

FEBRUARY?, l«9«i

FROM: DON GEORGE
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
FAX?:

530-<5804

TEL#:

530-6865

TO:

FAX#;~^TEL#:

PCELMAN, S.
SCHEFFLER, H.

521-7965
521-3731

521-7900
531-6600

tt-mQ
RE:
MESSA GE MR. POELMAN--ALTHOUGHI
HA\/r?,V

\AJUtTF/lP

RECITED SOME SPECIFICS IN
MY DECISION THIS EVENING, THA T WAS NOT ALL-INd.U'SIVE. YOU MA Y
UTILIZE ALL THE SUPPORT EVIDENCED IN YOUR DEFENSE THAT YOU FEEL IS
APPROPR'.A TE. IF I FEEL THA T SOMETHING MORE OR LESS IS NECESSARY, I'LL
ASK FOR A DISK SO I CAN MODIFY IT. THANK YOU. * * *OL G
CERTIFICA TE OF MAILING
I certify that I have mailed the attached FAX to the fu.'Icwing by first class
prepaid postage on the
day of EEEELLARY, 1996:
HAVEN WH1TEAR, ROUTE2. BOX 131, MORGAN, UT
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ADDENDUM 13:

July 26, 1996 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 93229
HAVEN WHITEAR,
Applicant,

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
BROWN SL ROOT, INC. ,
HIGHLANDS INSURANCE, and
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND

AND ORDER

Defendants.

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah#
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on
February 22, 1994 at 10:00 a.m. Said hearing
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.
Further hearing in Room 334, February 7, 1996
pursuant to Order and Notice of Commission.

BEFORE:

The Honorable Donald L. George, Administrative Law
Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Hans
Scheffler, Attorney at Law.
The Defendants were represented by Stuart L.
Poelman, Attorney at Law.
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by
Erie Boorman, Administrator.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
By an Application for Hearing filed with the Commission on
April 22, 1987, Applicant sought a declaration of Defendants1
liability for workers compensation benefits arising out of an
accident which he claimed to have occurred on February 17, 1987
while employed by the defendant Brown & Root at a plant site in
Clearfield, Utah. Applicant alleged that a toxic chemical
identified as Fyrquel 220 had spilled on him causing him injury.
Hearing on said Application was held before Administrative Law
Judge Timothy C. Allen on August 6, 1987, resulting in an Order
issued by Judge Allen dated August 7, 1987, noting that the
Defendants had accepted liability for said claimed industrial
accident and had agreed to pay all outstanding medical expenses
incurred by the Applicant to date. It was further noted that the
parties would consult and agree to a mutually-acceptable
physician to examine the Applicant further, with Brown & Root and
Highlands Insurance (herein called "Defendants") to pay the cost
of said examination. Thereafter, Applicant filed a Motion for
Appointment of Physician dated April 13, 1988, seeking an order
from the Commission appointing an out-of-state physician to
perform the contemplated examination of Applicant. Said order
was opposed by Defendants and resulted in the denial of said
Motion issued by Judge Allen in his letter dated May 4, 1988.
Thereafter, Whitear was examined by Dr. Attilio D. Renzetti at
the University of Utah Medical Center, who issued his report
dated July 14, 1988, noting that Applicant suffers from a
bronchial asthma secondary to his exposure to organic phosphates,
but that there was no evidence of either temporary or permanent
disability as a result thereof. At various times thereafter,
Defendants' counsel was contacted by Attorneys Virginius Dabney,
John Preston Creer and Morris & Morris representing Applicant and
requesting that Defendants accept liability for additional
workers compensation benefits arising out of said accident.
Defendants continued to deny liability for additional benefits
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based upon the evidence which had been generated, including the
medical report of Dr. Renzetti.
On February 15, 1993, Attorney Hans M. Scheffler filed the
Application for Hearing in this case on behalf of Applicant,
asserting that Defendants are liable for unpaid medical expenses,
permanent partial compensation, and travel expenses. Defendants
answered this Application by denying Defendants1 liability for
further benefits, and affirmatively alleging that Defendants1
liability for any further medical expenses being claimed is
barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in the
Workers Compensation Act as amended in 1988. The Application was
thereafter amended to include a claim for permanent total
disability, which was denied by Defendants. Hearing on
Applicant's amended Application was held on February 22, 1994
before Judge Allen, at which time the testimony of Applicant was
taken and documentary evidence was received. Thereafter, Judge
Allen issued his Preliminary Findings of Fact and referred the
case to a Medical Panel for its evaluation of the medical issues.
The Medical Panel, consisting of Doctors Madison H. Thomas,
Robert H. Burgoyne, and Kevin T. McCusker, submitted its report
to the Commission and said report was then served upon the
parties on September 28, 1994. Applicant objected to the Medical
Panel report, and a hearing on said objections was set but then
cancelled pursuant to Applicant's withdrawal of his objections.
Judge Allen then entered an Interim Order dated April 20, 1995,
containing a tentative finding that Applicant was permanently and
totally disabled as a result of said industrial accident. By
their letter dated May 19, 1995, Defendants objected to said
Interim Order and moved for a review thereof. Pursuant to
Defendants' motion for review, the full Commission entered its
Order of Remand dated July 31, 1995, whereby it ordered that a
further hearing be held on the Medical Panel report. Thereafter,
this case was reassigned to Judge Donald L. George for further
handling. A rehabilitation report from the Division of
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Rehabilitation Services, which had been ordered by Judge Allen,
was then received by the Commission and served upon the parties
by Judge George. Defendants objected to said rehabilitation
report, and Applicant responded, resulting in the determination
by Judge George that the objections of Defendants were well taken
and that a determination of the Defendants1 liability for the
claimed permanent total disability benefits should be made prior
to dealing with the question of rehabilitation. A hearing on the
remand was then scheduled and conducted on February 7, 1996, at
which time Doctors Thomas and Burgoyne of the Medical Panel were
present and testified, and the parties presented additional
evidence by way of testimony and documentation. Following the
taking of evidence at the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge
announced his decision with respect to the issues, and requested
that Defendants1 counsel prepare a proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order for his consideration.
Having been fully advised in the premises, the
Administrative Law Judge now enters the following Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. On February 17, 1987, Applicant sustained injuries as a
result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment with the defendant Brown & Root, when his clothes and
person were contaminated with a chemical identified as Fyrquel
220.
2. At the time of his accident, Applicant was receiving a
wage of $8.00 per hour, which resulted in an average weekly wage
of $340.00 per week. He was not married and had no dependent
children at that time. His compensation rate for his said
industrial accident is $213.00 per week.
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3 . Applicant was terminated from his employment with Brown
& Root on March 31, 1987.
4. Beginning January 8, 1988, Applicant applied for and
received unemployment compensation for a period of 20 weeks. He
then became employed by Loffland Brothers as a roughneck working
on drilling rigs commencing May 5, 1988, which employment
continued until his termination on December 29, 1989. He was
rendered unable to work between July 26, 1989 and September 14,
1989, because of a knee injury which he sustained in an
industrial accident while working for Loffland Brothers.
Following the termination of his employment with Loffland
Brothers, he applied for and received unemployment compensation
for a period of 26 weeks, extending into June 1990.
5. Applicant applied for and received Social Security
disability benefits commencing December 29, 1989. The Social
Security file reveals that the award of Social Security benefits
was made pursuant to criteria relating to Applicants depression.
6. Applicant's own testimony lacks credibility and is
therefore unreliable. His demeanor during the hearing on
February 7, 1996, demonstrated his unusual hostility resulting in
substantial exaggeration relating to many facts which he claims.
He maintained that he was bothered by the smell of perfumes and
colognes fla mile away", yet he did not appear to be affected by
those substances which were present in the hearing room. He also
made specific reference to his inability to tolerate the
disinfectants used in restrooms, yet he registered no complaint
toward those which were present in the restroom adjacent to the
hearing room. He maintains that his sex life has been
dramatically affected as a result of the industrial accident.
Such testimony is suspect in light of the fact that he has
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fathered three children since that time. He has consistently
claimed that he has had problems with his breathing since the
industrial accident, but the statement of his wife, Tracy Godwin,
which is contained in the Social Security file, represents that
he had no trouble breathing. He has also made inconsistent
statements to doctors who have treated and examined him over the
years since the industrial accident. In March 1987 he told the
doctor at the Tanner Clinic that he had smoked a pack a day for
several years. He then represented to Dr. Butler in July 1988
that he had recently quit smoking. In November 1988 he told Dr.
Able that he was a non-smoker. This was during his marriage to
Tracy Godwin, who represents in her statement that he was then
smoking regularly but representing to his doctors that he was a
non-smoker. In February 1991, he told Dr. Nelson that he had
quit smoking over a year ago, and he represented to the National
Jewish Center in Denver that he had quit smoking in February
1989. However, in his deposition taken in August 1993, he
admitted to having smoked within the last week. Then at the
hearing held on February 7, 1996, when asked if he had a smoking
history, his response was "slightly". Moreover, Dr. Madison
Thomas testified at the hearing that the physical tests which he
performed on the Applicant showed inconsistencies which
demonstrated that the Applicant putting forth less than an
appropriate amount of effort. Dr. Burgoyne also testified that
he was bothered by the Applicant's lack of credibility. In
addition, Dr. McCann indicated that the psychological testing
showed that the Applicant had engaged in attempts to fake the
results. He also noted that those tests demonstrated malingering
on the part of Applicant. Applicant's representation that his
physical abilities have been severely restricted since this
accident is belied by the fact that during the years 1988 and
1989 he was engaged in hard physical labor and worked extremely
long hours while working on a drilling rig for Loffland Brothers.
His representations concerning physical limitations is also
contradicted by the statement of his wife Tracy Godwin in her
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statement given to the Social Security Administration. It is also
noted that the Applicant is wise to the workers compensation
system, having claimed workers compensation benefits in
connection with several industrial accidents in the past,
including one for which he received compensation not long before
he ended his employment with Loffland Brothers. Applicant's
testimony was also at odds with regard to his plans to go on a
church mission. A letter of recommendation sent to Ricks College
noted that he intended to go on a mission after a year of school,
but Applicant denied that he ever told anyone of such an
intention. The Applicant's lack of credibility not only raises
questions concerning the testimony which he has provided at
hearing, but also diminishes the credence to be given to selfserving representations which he has made to his treating and
examining doctors.
7. This Administrative Law Judge adopts the findings of the
Medical Panel as contained in the Medical Panel report herein,
identified as Exhibit D-3 at the hearing conducted on February 7,
1996. The conclusions of the Medical Panel as contained in its
report are strongly confirmed by other medical facts and opinions
of record herein.
8. The industrial accident of February 17, 1987 caused
Applicant's asthma. His asthma has resulted in a 10% whole
person permanent partial impairment.
9. Said asthma has not prohibited Applicant from continuing
his employment, and is not the cause of his claimed permanent
total disability.
10. Applicant suffers from depression, which has prohibited
him from working regularly during various periods of time since
his industrial accident. However, his depression is not the
result of his industrial accident of February 17, 1987, but
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rather the result of numerous factors which either preceded or
were subsequent to said industrial accident.
11. Applicant was provided with vocational rehabilitation
training but failed to pursue it.
12. Applicant's depression is treatable and treatment would
likely be effective in improving his condition. However, he has
failed to take depression medication which had been prescribed
for him and he has otherwise failed to pursue treatment.
13. The record is without substantial evidence that
Applicant has himself paid medical expenses for which claim can
be made against Defendants in this case, nor is there evidence
that any such medical expenses are yet unpaid. The medical
expense arising out of Applicant's evaluation at the National
Jewish Center in Denver, Colorado was incurred on his own and at
the instigation of his attorney, and was contrary to the order of
Judge Allen with respect to an evaluation to be paid for by
Defendants. The last medical expense claimed by Applicant which
was paid by Defendants prior to the filing of the Application
herein was the billing of Dr. Renzetti in the sum of $28.00 for
services rendered November 28, 1989. Said expense was paid by
Defendants on January 12, 1990. No other claimed medical
expenses for treatment were submitted to Defendants for payment
between January 12, 1990 and the filing of the Application herein
on February 16, 1993.
14. Prior to his said industrial accident, Applicant had
sustained a 1% whole person permanent partial impairment as a
result of surgery to his left knee. In addition, one-half of the
5% permanent partial impairment assessed by the Medical Panel
relating to Applicant's psychiatric problems are attributed to
his condition before the industrial accident. Thus, Applicant
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suffered from a total of 3-1/2% whole person impairment which was
existing prior to his industrial accident.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. Applicant is entitled to compensation from Defendants
for a 10% permanent partial impairment relating to his asthma
caused by his industrial accident of February 17, 1989.
2. The Employers Reinsurance Fund is liable to Applicant
for permanent partial impairment compensation amounting to 3-1/2%
of the whole person for left knee and psychological impairment
attributed to his condition prior to the industrial accident
herein.
3. Applicant is entitled to recover from Defendants and
from the Employers Reinsurance Fund interest on his awards of
compensation herein at the statutory rate of 8% per annum from
May 25, 1994, the date of the Medical Panel report.
4. Applicant's attorney, Hans M. Scheffler, is entitled to
receive an attorney's fee for his services rendered to Applicant
in connection with this Application. Said attorney's fee should
be deducted from the benefits due to Applicant and paid directly
to Attorney Scheffler.
5. Applicant's claim for additional medical expenses
arising out of his industrial accident of February 17, 1989 is
barred by the three-year statute of limitations contained in
Section 35-1-99(2) of the 1988 Utah Workers Compensation Act.
6. Applicant is not entitled to permanent total disability
benefits as a result of the industrial accident.
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Brown & Root, Inc.
and Highlands Insurance, pay the Applicant Haven Whitear
permanent partial disability compensation at the rate of $213.00
per week for 31.2 weeks, for a total of $6,645.60, for the 10%
whole person permanent partial impairment which he sustained in
connection with his asthmatic condition caused by the industrial
accident of February 17, 1987.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employers Reinsurance Fund
shall pay Applicant compensation at the rate of $213.00 per week
for 11.12 weeks, for a total of $2,368.56 for the 3.5% impairment
attributable to Applicant's impairment prior to the industrial
accident.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants and the Employers
Reinsurance Fund pay Applicant interest on the compensation
awarded herein at the statutory rate of 8% per annum beginning
May 25, 1994, the date of the Medical Panel report, and
continuing until said compensation is paid.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants pay Hans M. Scheffler,
attorney for Applicant, the sum of $1,802.83 plus 20% of the
interest payable on the awards made herein for services rendered
in this matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid awards
to Applicant.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any and all additional workers
compensation benefits claimed by Applicant herein be and are
hereby denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any motion for review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of
the date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
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objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
not subject to review or appeal.
DATED this g?(pjffiday of July, 1996.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
^Uw£>-

^^/d^^\<^lJ>
DONALD L. GEORGE
Administrative Law Judge
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ADDENDUIVI 14:

December 19, 1997 Order on Motion for Review

APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
HAVEN WHITEAR,

*
*
*

Applicant,

ORDER ON MOTION
FOR REVIEW

*

v.

*
*

BROWN & ROOT, INC., HIGHLANDS
INSURANCE, and EMPLOYERS*
REINSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

*
*

Case No. 93-0229

*

Haven Whitear asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review the
Administrative Law Judge's decision regarding Mr. Whitear's claim for benefits under the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act.
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-80i(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Mr. Whitear presents a wide variety of procedural and substantive issues, as follows: 1) The
propriety of The Industrial Commission of Utah's previous order remanding Mr. Whitear's claim
to the ALJ for further proceedings; 2) Whether Mr. Whitear's work accident was a cause of his
depression; 3) Mr. Whitear's right to permanent total disability compensation under the Act; 4) The
credibility of Mr. Whitear's testimony; 5) The ALJ's reliance on defense counsel to draft proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law; 6) Defendant's liability for Mr. Whitear's medical expenses
related to his asthma; and 7) Mr. Whitear's claim to additional permanent partial disability benefits
from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. ("ERF").
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Appeals Board adopts the findings of fact set forth in the decision of the ALJ.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
For clarity, each issue raised by Mr. Whitear will be addressed separately.
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I.

PROPRIETY OF REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

Mr. Whitear contends the Industrial Commission erred in remanding Mr. Whitear's claim
to the A U for a hearing on the medical panel's report. The Appeals Board does not agree.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") requires that hearings be conducted to
obtain full disclosure of all relevant facts. Section 63-46b-8(l)(a), Utah Code Ann. At the time it
issued its order of remand, the Industrial Commission was the ultimate fact finder in workers'
compensation cases. United States Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 607 P.2d 807 (Utah 1980).
Section 63-46b-12 of UAPA specifically authorized the Industrial Commission to remand "all"or any
portion of an adjudicative proceeding" for further proceedings. Furthermore, the medical panel
serves as an independent objective, scientific consultant to the Commission. In light of the
Industrial Commission's determination that further explanation was necessary regarding the cause
of Mr. Whitear's depression, the Industrial Commission's remand to obtain specific clarification
from the medical panel was a reasonable application of its authority to obtain all relevant facts.
II.

MR. WHITEAR'S WORK ACCIDENT AS A CAUSE OF HIS DEPRESSION.

In every workers' compensation case, it is the applicant's burden to prove that his or her
work accident is a cause of the disability for which compensation is sought. In this case. Mr.
Whitear has argued that his work accident was a cause of his depression. However, the Appeals
Board agrees with the ALJ that the contrary evidence, including the expert opinions of Dr.
Burgoyne and Dr. McCann, is more persuasive. The Appeals Board therefore concludes, as did the
ALJ, that Mr. Whitear has failed to establish that his work accident caused his depression.
III.

MR. WHITEAR'S RIGHT TO PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION.

Mr. Whitear contends he is entitled to permanent total disability compensation because of
his impairment from work-related asthma. In support of this contention, Mr. Whitear points to the
Social Security Administration's finding that he is totally disabled. However, the Social Security
Administration's decision is not determinative on the question of Mr. Whitear's eligibility for
workers' compensation benefits. Having reviewed the evidence on this issue, the Appeals Board
concludes that Mr. Whitear has failed to establish that he is permanently and totally disabled as a
result of his asthma.
IV.

MR. WHITEAR'S CREDIBILITY.

Mr. Whitear contends the .ALJ erred in concluding he lacked credibility. The Appeals Board
agrees with Mr. Whitear that some of the ALJ's examples of Mr. Whitear's lack of credibility are
unpersuasive. However, other factors do undercut Mr. Whitear's credibility, such as his claim of the
ability to smell perfume at a distance of one mile and his unpersuasive performance on psychological
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and physical tests administered by the medical experts. Furthermore, the ALJ was in the position
to directly observe Mr. Whitear's demeanor during the hearing. Consequently, the Appeals Board
accepts the ALJ's conclusion regarding Mr. Whitear's credibility. More importantly, the Appeals
Board notes that Mr. Whitear's eligibility for workers' compensation benefits does not depend on
his personal credibility, but rather, on the reasoned opinions of the qualified medical experts who
have examined him.
V.

PREPARATION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS BY COUNSEL.

At the conclusion of the hearing on Mr. Whitear's claim, the ALJ instructed counsel for
defendants to prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions. Mr. Whitear contends the ALJ
failed to give any guidance to defense counsel as to the content of the decision. Mr. Whitear
therefore argues that the ALJ failed to perform his duty to decide the case.
The record shows that at the conclusions of Mr. Whitear's hearing, the ALJ explained the
factual and legal basis for his decision, thereby guiding defense counsel's preparation of a proposed
decision. Obviously, the ALJ retained authority to accept, reject, or modify the proposed decision
and it is the ALJ who ultimately is responsible for the decision's content. The Appeals Board notes
that the decision, as issued, is consistent with the ALJ's oral decision announced at the end of the
hearing. Furthermore, the Appeals Board has full power to correct any error contained in the ALJ's
decision. Consequently, the Appeals Board finds no basis to reverse the ALJ's decision because of
defense counsel's participation in the drafting process.
VI. BROWN & ROOT'S LIABILITY FOR ASTHMA-RELATED MEDICAL EXPENSES.
The ALJ concluded that "(applicant's claim for additional medical expenses arising out of
his industrial accident of February 17, 198(7) is barred by the three-year statute of limitations
contained in Section 35-1-99(2) of the 1988 Utah Workers' Compensation Act." At the time the ALJ
issued his decision, the foregoing conclusion was supported by the Utah Court of Appeals* decision
in Brown & Root . 905 P.2d 305 (Utah App. 1995). However, on October 14, 1997, the Utah
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the "three year provision" of §35-1-99(2)
is not applicable to claims for medical treatment arising from accidents prior to 1988. Brown &
Root v. Industrial Commission. Nos. 960083 and 960084, slip op. (UT October 14, 1997)
Consequently, defendants remain liable for all medical care necessary to treat Mr. Whitear's asthma
arising from his 1987 accident.
VII.

ADDITIONAL PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY BENEFITS FROM THE ERF.

The ALJ found that Mr. Whitear suffered a combined permanent partial disability of 7% for
impairments arising from injuries to his knees and from his depression. Based on the medical
panel's report, the ALJ also found that one-half of this 7% disability existed prior to his work
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accident of February 17, 1987, while the remaining one-half arose after the work accident. The ALJ
therefore awarded permanent partial disability compensation to Mr. Whitear for a whole person
impairment of 3.5%, based on the preexisting impairment.
Mr. Whitear contends the ALJ should have awarded permanent partial disability for the entire
7% impairment, regardless of whether the impairment arose before or after his work accident.
However, §35-1-69 of the Act in effect at the time of Mr. Whitear's accident authorizes the ERF to
pay compensation only for permanent impairments that existed prior to the work accident.
Consequently, the ALJ's order directing the ERF to pay permanent partial disability compensation
based on Mr. Whitear's preexisting 3.5% impairment is correct.
ORDER
The Appeals Board reverses the ALJ's conclusion that Mr. Whitear's right to payment of
medical expenses necessary to treat his work-related asthma is barred by §35-1-99(2) of the Act.
The Appeals Board hereby orders defendants to pay the reasonable expense of such medical care.
The Appeals Board affirms all other portions of the ALJ's decision. It is so ordered.
Dated this / f o a y of December, 1997.
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DISSENT
I dissent from the following points of the majority decision.

I.

PROPRIETY OF REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

Although the former Industrial Commission may have had the legal right to remand Mr.
Whitear's claim for further proceedings, I believe such authority should not have been exercised
under the circumstances of this case.
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At the time the Industrial Commission remanded Mr. Whitear's claim for further
proceedings, the record contained sufficient evidence to allow the Industrial Commission to render
a fair and reasoned decision on the issue of medical causation. The ALT assigned to the case at that
time was correct in his conclusion that, on the central issue of medical causation, there was no
evidence to support the medical panel's opinion that Mr. Whitear had suffered from depression prior
to his work accident of February 17, 1987. To the contrary, the underlying evidence showed that
Mr Whitear's depression did not appear until after the work accident, and as a result of that accident.
Consequently I believe the Industrial Commission should not have remanded the case for further
proceedings, but instead should have adopted the ALJ's tentative finding that Mr. Whitear was
permanently and totally disabled as a result of his work-related depression.
II.

MR. WHITEAR'S WORK ACCIDENT AS A CAUSE OF HIS DEPRESSION

As discussed in Point I. I would not have remanded Mr. Whitear's claim for a second
hearin" Nevertheless, the testimony adduced at the second hearing also supports Mr. Whitear's
ri<mt to benefits for his work-related depression. The opinion of Mr. Whitear's expert psychologist
that Mr Whitear's depression was caused by his work accident was consistent with Mr. Whitear s
actual history as described bv Mr. Whitear himself and other witnesses who had worked and
socialized with Mr. Whitear before the accident. It was their universal observation that Mr. Whitear
was completely free of depression prior to the accident.
The medical panel supported its hypothesis that Mr. Whitear suffered from pre-existing
depression based on a shopping list of theoretical causes for such depression. However, one: by-one.
such theoretical causes were specifically refuted by witnesses with personal knowledge of the tacts.
Bv the end of the second hearina, the foundation of the medical panel's report was undermined,
leaving the expert opinion in support of Mr. Whitear's claim as the most credible evidence on the
issue of causation.
I do not lightly disregard the ALJ's determinations, but reversal of the ALJ's decision is
warranted in this case. I believe Mr. Whitear has established a causal connection exists between his
work accident and his depression. He has met his burden of proof and his claim should move
forward to determine the extent of his disability.
IV.

MR. WHITEAR'S CREDIBILITY

I a^ree with the majority's statement that the outcome of this case does not turn on Mr
Whitear's credibility. However'. I strongly disagree with the ALJ's opinion that Mr. Whitear and
everv witness who supported him lacked credibility. Obviously. Mr. Whitear's testimony was given
under stressful conditions. Nevertheless, the testimony of Mr. Whitear and his witnesses was
straight forward, based on direct personal knowledge, and internally consistent. In my view, such
testimony was not only worthy of belief, but was essentially uncontradicted.
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V.

PREPARATION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS BY COUNSEL

I do not consider it improper in every case for the ALJ to rely upon prevailing counsel to
draft proposed findings and conclusions. However, in those cases where the ALJ makes such an
assignment to prevailing counsel, opposing counsel should be provided the opportunity to review
and comment on the proposed findings and conclusions before they are entered by the ALJ. Such
a practice is followed in district courts, with good r e s u l t s . / / ^ ,1 / I
&*
-~4
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days
of the date of this order.
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